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lsm.c
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linux-6.19.14/security/apparmor/lsm.c
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2/* 3 * AppArmor security module 4 * 5 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. 6 * 7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE 8 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. 9 */ 10 11#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 12#include <linux/moduleparam.h> 13#include <linux/mm.h> 14#include <linux/mman.h> 15#include <linux/mount.h> 16#include <linux/namei.h> 17#include <linux/ptrace.h> 18#include <linux/ctype.h> 19#include <linux/sysctl.h> 20#include <linux/audit.h> 21#include <linux/user_namespace.h> 22#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> 23#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> 24#include <linux/zstd.h> 25#include <net/sock.h> 26#include <uapi/linux/mount.h> 27#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> 28 29#include "include/af_unix.h" 30#include "include/apparmor.h" 31#include "include/apparmorfs.h" 32#include "include/audit.h" 33#include "include/capability.h" 34#include "include/cred.h" 35#include "include/crypto.h" 36#include "include/file.h" 37#include "include/ipc.h" 38#include "include/net.h" 39#include "include/path.h" 40#include "include/label.h" 41#include "include/policy.h" 42#include "include/policy_ns.h" 43#include "include/procattr.h" 44#include "include/mount.h" 45#include "include/secid.h" 46 47/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ 48int apparmor_initialized; 49 50union aa_buffer { 51 struct list_head list; 52 DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer); 53}; 54 55struct aa_local_cache { 56 unsigned int hold; 57 unsigned int count; 58 struct list_head head; 59}; 60 61#define RESERVE_COUNT 2 62static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT; 63static int buffer_count; 64 65static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers); 66static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock); 67static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers); 68 69/* 70 * LSM hook functions 71 */ 72 73/* 74 * put the associated labels 75 */ 76static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 77{ 78 aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); 79 set_cred_label(cred, NULL); 80} 81 82/* 83 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials 84 */ 85static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 86{ 87 set_cred_label(cred, NULL); 88 return 0; 89} 90 91/* 92 * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block 93 */ 94static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 95 gfp_t gfp) 96{ 97 set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); 98 return 0; 99} 100 101/* 102 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds 103 */ 104static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 105{ 106 set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); 107} 108 109static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 110{ 111 112 aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); 113} 114 115static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, 116 u64 clone_flags) 117{ 118 struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); 119 120 aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current)); 121 122 return 0; 123} 124 125static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, 126 unsigned int mode) 127{ 128 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; 129 const struct cred *cred; 130 int error; 131 bool needput; 132 133 cred = get_task_cred(child); 134 tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ 135 tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 136 error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee, 137 (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ 138 : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); 139 __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer, needput); 140 put_cred(cred); 141 142 return error; 143} 144 145static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 146{ 147 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; 148 const struct cred *cred; 149 int error; 150 bool needput; 151 152 tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 153 cred = get_task_cred(parent); 154 tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ 155 error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee, 156 AA_PTRACE_TRACE); 157 put_cred(cred); 158 __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee, needput); 159 160 return error; 161} 162 163/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ 164static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, 165 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) 166{ 167 struct aa_label *label; 168 const struct cred *cred; 169 170 rcu_read_lock(); 171 cred = __task_cred(target); 172 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); 173 174 /* 175 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will 176 * initialize effective and permitted. 177 */ 178 if (!unconfined(label)) { 179 struct aa_profile *profile; 180 struct label_it i; 181 182 label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { 183 kernel_cap_t allowed; 184 185 allowed = aa_profile_capget(profile); 186 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, allowed); 187 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, allowed); 188 } 189 } 190 rcu_read_unlock(); 191 aa_put_label(label); 192 193 return 0; 194} 195 196static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, 197 int cap, unsigned int opts) 198{ 199 struct aa_label *label; 200 int error = 0; 201 202 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); 203 if (!unconfined(label)) 204 error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts); 205 aa_put_label(label); 206 207 return error; 208} 209 210/** 211 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths 212 * @op: operation being checked 213 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) 214 * @mask: requested permissions mask 215 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) 216 * 217 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 218 */ 219static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, 220 struct path_cond *cond) 221{ 222 struct aa_label *label; 223 int error = 0; 224 bool needput; 225 226 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 227 if (!unconfined(label)) 228 error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask, 229 cond); 230 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 231 232 return error; 233} 234 235/** 236 * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond 237 * @op: operation being checked 238 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL) 239 * @mask: requested permissions mask 240 * 241 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 242 */ 243static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) 244{ 245 vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt), 246 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); 247 struct path_cond cond = { 248 vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), 249 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode 250 }; 251 252 if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry)) 253 return 0; 254 255 return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond); 256} 257 258/** 259 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry 260 * @op: operation being checked 261 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) 262 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) 263 * @mask: requested permissions mask 264 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) 265 * 266 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 267 */ 268static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir, 269 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, 270 struct path_cond *cond) 271{ 272 struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry }; 273 274 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); 275} 276 277/** 278 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm 279 * @op: operation being checked 280 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) 281 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) 282 * @mask: requested permission mask 283 * 284 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 285 */ 286static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, 287 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) 288{ 289 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 290 struct path_cond cond = { }; 291 vfsuid_t vfsuid; 292 293 if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) 294 return 0; 295 296 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode); 297 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 298 cond.mode = inode->i_mode; 299 300 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); 301} 302 303/** 304 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create 305 * @op: operation being checked 306 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) 307 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) 308 * @mask: request permission mask 309 * @mode: created file mode 310 * 311 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 312 */ 313static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir, 314 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) 315{ 316 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; 317 318 if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry)) 319 return 0; 320 321 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); 322} 323 324static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 325{ 326 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); 327} 328 329static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 330 umode_t mode) 331{ 332 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, 333 S_IFDIR); 334} 335 336static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 337{ 338 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); 339} 340 341static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 342 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 343{ 344 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); 345} 346 347static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 348{ 349 return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR); 350} 351 352static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file) 353{ 354 return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path); 355} 356 357static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 358 const char *old_name) 359{ 360 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, 361 S_IFLNK); 362} 363 364static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 365 struct dentry *new_dentry) 366{ 367 struct aa_label *label; 368 int error = 0; 369 370 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) 371 return 0; 372 373 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 374 if (!unconfined(label)) 375 error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir, 376 new_dentry); 377 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 378 379 return error; 380} 381 382static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 383 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 384 const unsigned int flags) 385{ 386 struct aa_label *label; 387 int error = 0; 388 389 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) 390 return 0; 391 if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry)) 392 return 0; 393 394 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 395 if (!unconfined(label)) { 396 struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt); 397 vfsuid_t vfsuid; 398 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, 399 .dentry = old_dentry }; 400 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, 401 .dentry = new_dentry }; 402 struct path_cond cond = { 403 .mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode 404 }; 405 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); 406 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 407 408 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 409 struct path_cond cond_exchange = { 410 .mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode, 411 }; 412 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); 413 cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 414 415 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), 416 label, &new_path, 0, 417 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | 418 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, 419 &cond_exchange); 420 if (!error) 421 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), 422 label, &old_path, 423 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | 424 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange); 425 } 426 427 if (!error) 428 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), 429 label, &old_path, 0, 430 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | 431 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, 432 &cond); 433 if (!error) 434 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), 435 label, &new_path, 436 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | 437 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); 438 439 } 440 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 441 442 return error; 443} 444 445static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 446{ 447 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD); 448} 449 450static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 451{ 452 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN); 453} 454 455static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 456{ 457 return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); 458} 459 460static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) 461{ 462 struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); 463 struct aa_label *label; 464 int error = 0; 465 bool needput; 466 467 if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) 468 return 0; 469 470 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. 471 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with 472 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to 473 * actually execute the image. 474 * 475 * Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode. 476 */ 477 if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) { 478 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; 479 return 0; 480 } 481 482 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label_condref(file->f_cred, &needput); 483 if (!unconfined(label)) { 484 struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); 485 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); 486 vfsuid_t vfsuid; 487 struct path_cond cond = { 488 .mode = inode->i_mode, 489 }; 490 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); 491 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 492 493 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred, 494 label, &file->f_path, 0, 495 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); 496 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ 497 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); 498 } 499 aa_put_label_condref(label, needput); 500 501 return error; 502} 503 504static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) 505{ 506 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); 507 struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 508 509 spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); 510 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); 511 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 512 return 0; 513} 514 515static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) 516{ 517 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); 518 519 if (ctx) 520 aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); 521} 522 523static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask) 524{ 525 struct aa_label *label; 526 int error = 0; 527 528 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 529 error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, false); 530 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 531 532 return error; 533} 534 535static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file) 536{ 537 return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file)); 538} 539 540static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 541{ 542 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); 543} 544 545static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 546{ 547 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; 548 549 if (cmd == F_WRLCK) 550 mask |= MAY_WRITE; 551 552 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); 553} 554 555static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 556 unsigned long flags) 557{ 558 int mask = 0; 559 560 if (!file || !file_ctx(file)) 561 return 0; 562 563 if (prot & PROT_READ) 564 mask |= MAY_READ; 565 /* 566 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't 567 * write back to the files 568 */ 569 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) 570 mask |= MAY_WRITE; 571 if (prot & PROT_EXEC) 572 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; 573 574 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); 575} 576 577static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, 578 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) 579{ 580 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); 581} 582 583static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, 584 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) 585{ 586 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, 587 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); 588} 589 590#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 591static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask) 592{ 593 if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL) 594 return "sqpoll"; 595 if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED) 596 return "override_creds"; 597 return ""; 598} 599 600static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) 601{ 602 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); 603 604 if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { 605 audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"%s\"", 606 audit_uring_mask(ad->request)); 607 if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { 608 audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"%s\"", 609 audit_uring_mask(ad->denied)); 610 } 611 } 612 if (ad->uring.target) { 613 audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext="); 614 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), 615 ad->uring.target, 616 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); 617 } 618} 619 620static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, 621 struct aa_label *new, int cap, 622 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) 623{ 624 unsigned int state; 625 struct aa_ruleset *rules; 626 int error = 0; 627 628 AA_BUG(!profile); 629 630 rules = profile->label.rules[0]; 631 state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING); 632 if (state) { 633 struct aa_perms perms = { }; 634 635 if (new) { 636 aa_label_match(profile, rules, new, state, 637 false, request, &perms); 638 } else { 639 perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); 640 } 641 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); 642 error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, 643 audit_uring_cb); 644 } 645 646 return error; 647} 648 649/** 650 * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override 651 * @new: the target creds 652 * 653 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials 654 * to service an io_uring operation. 655 */ 656static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 657{ 658 struct aa_profile *profile; 659 struct aa_label *label; 660 int error; 661 bool needput; 662 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, 663 OP_URING_OVERRIDE); 664 665 ad.uring.target = cred_label(new); 666 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 667 error = fn_for_each(label, profile, 668 profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED, 669 cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); 670 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 671 672 return error; 673} 674 675/** 676 * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created 677 * 678 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring 679 * kernel polling thread. 680 */ 681static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void) 682{ 683 struct aa_profile *profile; 684 struct aa_label *label; 685 int error; 686 bool needput; 687 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, 688 OP_URING_SQPOLL); 689 690 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 691 error = fn_for_each(label, profile, 692 profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL, 693 NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); 694 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 695 696 return error; 697} 698#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 699 700static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 701 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 702{ 703 struct aa_label *label; 704 int error = 0; 705 bool needput; 706 707 /* Discard magic */ 708 if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) 709 flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; 710 711 flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; 712 713 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 714 if (!unconfined(label)) { 715 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) 716 error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags, 717 data); 718 else if (flags & MS_BIND) 719 error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path, 720 dev_name, flags); 721 else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | 722 MS_UNBINDABLE)) 723 error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label, 724 path, flags); 725 else if (flags & MS_MOVE) 726 error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path, 727 dev_name); 728 else 729 error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name, 730 path, type, flags, data); 731 } 732 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 733 734 return error; 735} 736 737static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 738 const struct path *to_path) 739{ 740 struct aa_label *label; 741 int error = 0; 742 bool needput; 743 744 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 745 if (!unconfined(label)) 746 error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path, 747 to_path); 748 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 749 750 return error; 751} 752 753static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 754{ 755 struct aa_label *label; 756 int error = 0; 757 bool needput; 758 759 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 760 if (!unconfined(label)) 761 error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags); 762 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 763 764 return error; 765} 766 767static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 768 const struct path *new_path) 769{ 770 struct aa_label *label; 771 int error = 0; 772 773 label = aa_get_current_label(); 774 if (!unconfined(label)) 775 error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path); 776 aa_put_label(label); 777 778 return error; 779} 780 781static int apparmor_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *lx, 782 u32 *size, u32 flags) 783{ 784 int error = -ENOENT; 785 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); 786 struct aa_label *label = NULL; 787 char *value = NULL; 788 789 switch (attr) { 790 case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT: 791 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(current_cred())); 792 break; 793 case LSM_ATTR_PREV: 794 if (ctx->previous) 795 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); 796 break; 797 case LSM_ATTR_EXEC: 798 if (ctx->onexec) 799 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); 800 break; 801 default: 802 error = -EOPNOTSUPP; 803 break; 804 } 805 806 if (label) { 807 error = aa_getprocattr(label, &value, false); 808 if (error > 0) 809 error = lsm_fill_user_ctx(lx, size, value, error, 810 LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 0); 811 kfree(value); 812 } 813 814 aa_put_label(label); 815 816 if (error < 0) 817 return error; 818 return 1; 819} 820 821static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name, 822 char **value) 823{ 824 int error = -ENOENT; 825 /* released below */ 826 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); 827 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); 828 struct aa_label *label = NULL; 829 830 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) 831 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); 832 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous) 833 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); 834 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) 835 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); 836 else 837 error = -EINVAL; 838 839 if (label) 840 error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, true); 841 842 aa_put_label(label); 843 put_cred(cred); 844 845 return error; 846} 847 848static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) 849{ 850 char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; 851 size_t arg_size; 852 int error; 853 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, 854 OP_SETPROCATTR); 855 856 if (size == 0) 857 return -EINVAL; 858 859 /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ 860 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { 861 /* null terminate */ 862 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 863 if (!args) 864 return -ENOMEM; 865 memcpy(args, value, size); 866 args[size] = '\0'; 867 } 868 869 error = -EINVAL; 870 args = strim(args); 871 command = strsep(&args, " "); 872 if (!args) 873 goto out; 874 args = skip_spaces(args); 875 if (!*args) 876 goto out; 877 878 arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); 879 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) { 880 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { 881 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, 882 AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); 883 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { 884 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, 885 AA_CHANGE_TEST); 886 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { 887 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); 888 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { 889 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST); 890 } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) { 891 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK); 892 } else 893 goto fail; 894 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) { 895 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) 896 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC); 897 else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) 898 error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC | 899 AA_CHANGE_STACK)); 900 else 901 goto fail; 902 } else 903 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ 904 goto fail; 905 906 if (!error) 907 error = size; 908out: 909 kfree(largs); 910 return error; 911 912fail: 913 ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 914 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) 915 ad.info = "current"; 916 else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) 917 ad.info = "exec"; 918 else 919 ad.info = "invalid"; 920 ad.error = error = -EINVAL; 921 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL); 922 end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label); 923 goto out; 924} 925 926static int apparmor_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx, 927 u32 size, u32 flags) 928{ 929 int rc; 930 931 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT && attr != LSM_ATTR_EXEC) 932 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 933 934 rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len); 935 if (rc > 0) 936 return 0; 937 return rc; 938} 939 940static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, 941 size_t size) 942{ 943 int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name); 944 945 if (attr) 946 return do_setattr(attr, value, size); 947 return -EINVAL; 948} 949 950/** 951 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds 952 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 953 */ 954static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) 955{ 956 struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); 957 struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred); 958 959 /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ 960 if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) || 961 (unconfined(new_label))) 962 return; 963 964 aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files); 965 966 current->pdeath_signal = 0; 967 968 /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ 969 __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label); 970} 971 972/** 973 * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed 974 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 975 */ 976static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) 977{ 978 /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ 979 aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); 980 981 return; 982} 983 984static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) 985{ 986 struct aa_label *label; 987 bool needput; 988 989 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 990 prop->apparmor.label = label; 991 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 992} 993 994static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, 995 struct lsm_prop *prop) 996{ 997 struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); 998 999 prop->apparmor.label = label; 1000 aa_put_label(label); 1001} 1002 1003static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, 1004 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) 1005{ 1006 struct aa_label *label; 1007 int error = 0; 1008 bool needput; 1009 1010 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 1011 1012 if (!unconfined(label)) 1013 error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task, 1014 resource, new_rlim); 1015 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 1016 1017 return error; 1018} 1019 1020static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 1021 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 1022{ 1023 const struct cred *tc; 1024 struct aa_label *cl, *tl; 1025 int error; 1026 bool needput; 1027 1028 tc = get_task_cred(target); 1029 tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc); 1030 if (cred) { 1031 /* 1032 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior 1033 */ 1034 cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); 1035 error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig); 1036 aa_put_label(cl); 1037 } else { 1038 cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 1039 error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig); 1040 __end_current_label_crit_section(cl, needput); 1041 } 1042 aa_put_label(tl); 1043 put_cred(tc); 1044 1045 return error; 1046} 1047 1048static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred) 1049{ 1050 struct aa_label *label; 1051 struct aa_profile *profile; 1052 int error = 0; 1053 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS, 1054 OP_USERNS_CREATE); 1055 1056 ad.subj_cred = current_cred(); 1057 1058 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1059 if (!unconfined(label)) { 1060 error = fn_for_each(label, profile, 1061 aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad, 1062 AA_USERNS_CREATE)); 1063 } 1064 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1065 1066 return error; 1067} 1068 1069static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp) 1070{ 1071 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1072 struct aa_label *label; 1073 bool needput; 1074 1075 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 1076 //spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); 1077 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); 1078 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, NULL); 1079 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, NULL); 1080 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 1081 return 0; 1082} 1083 1084static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) 1085{ 1086 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1087 1088 /* dead these won't be updated any more */ 1089 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true)); 1090 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, true)); 1091 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer_lastupdate, true)); 1092} 1093 1094/** 1095 * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field 1096 * @sk: sock to have security cloned 1097 * @newsk: sock getting clone 1098 */ 1099static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, 1100 struct sock *newsk) 1101{ 1102 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1103 struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk); 1104 1105 /* not actually in use yet */ 1106 if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != rcu_access_pointer(new->label)) { 1107 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->label, true)); 1108 rcu_assign_pointer(new->label, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label)); 1109 } 1110 1111 if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer)) { 1112 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer, true)); 1113 rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer)); 1114 } 1115 1116 if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate)) { 1117 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer_lastupdate, true)); 1118 rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate, 1119 aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer_lastupdate)); 1120 } 1121} 1122 1123static int unix_connect_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label, 1124 struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk) 1125{ 1126 struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk); 1127 int error; 1128 1129 error = aa_unix_peer_perm(cred, label, OP_CONNECT, 1130 (AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE), 1131 sk, peer_sk, 1132 rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, 1133 lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock))); 1134 if (!is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) { 1135 last_error(error, 1136 aa_unix_peer_perm(cred, 1137 rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, 1138 lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock)), 1139 OP_CONNECT, 1140 (AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE), 1141 peer_sk, sk, label)); 1142 } 1143 1144 return error; 1145} 1146 1147/* lockdep check in unix_connect_perm - push sks here to check */ 1148static void unix_connect_peers(struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx, 1149 struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx) 1150{ 1151 /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */ 1152 struct aa_label *label = rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->label, true); 1153 1154 aa_get_label(label); 1155 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->peer, 1156 true)); 1157 rcu_assign_pointer(peer_ctx->peer, label); /* transfer cnt */ 1158 1159 label = aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, 1160 true)); 1161 //spin_unlock(&peer_ctx->lock); 1162 1163 //spin_lock(&sk_ctx->lock); 1164 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer, 1165 true)); 1166 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate, 1167 true)); 1168 1169 rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer, aa_get_label(label)); 1170 rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate, label); /* transfer cnt */ 1171 //spin_unlock(&sk_ctx->lock); 1172} 1173 1174/** 1175 * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn 1176 * @sk: sk attempting to connect 1177 * @peer_sk: sk that is accepting the connection 1178 * @newsk: new sk created for this connection 1179 * peer is locked when this hook is called 1180 * 1181 * Return: 1182 * 0 if connection is permitted 1183 * error code on denial or failure 1184 */ 1185static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk, 1186 struct sock *newsk) 1187{ 1188 struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1189 struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk); 1190 struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = aa_sock(newsk); 1191 struct aa_label *label; 1192 int error; 1193 bool needput; 1194 1195 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 1196 error = unix_connect_perm(current_cred(), label, sk, peer_sk); 1197 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 1198 1199 if (error) 1200 return error; 1201 1202 /* newsk doesn't go through post_create, but does go through 1203 * security_sk_alloc() 1204 */ 1205 rcu_assign_pointer(new_ctx->label, 1206 aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, 1207 true))); 1208 1209 /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */ 1210 unix_connect_peers(sk_ctx, new_ctx); 1211 1212 return 0; 1213} 1214 1215/** 1216 * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams 1217 * @sock: socket sending the message 1218 * @peer: socket message is being send to 1219 * 1220 * Performs bidirectional permission checks for Unix domain socket communication: 1221 * 1. Verifies sender has AA_MAY_SEND to target socket 1222 * 2. Verifies receiver has AA_MAY_RECEIVE from source socket 1223 * 1224 * sock and peer are locked when this hook is called 1225 * called by: dgram_connect peer setup but path not copied to newsk 1226 * 1227 * Return: 1228 * 0 if transmission is permitted 1229 * error code on denial or failure 1230 */ 1231static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer) 1232{ 1233 struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer->sk); 1234 struct aa_label *label; 1235 int error; 1236 bool needput; 1237 1238 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); 1239 error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(current_cred(), 1240 label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, 1241 sock->sk, peer->sk, 1242 rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, 1243 true)), 1244 aa_unix_peer_perm(peer->file ? peer->file->f_cred : NULL, 1245 rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, 1246 true), 1247 OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, peer->sk, 1248 sock->sk, label)); 1249 __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); 1250 1251 return error; 1252} 1253 1254static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 1255{ 1256 struct aa_label *label; 1257 int error = 0; 1258 1259 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1260 1261 if (kern) 1262 return 0; 1263 1264 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1265 if (!unconfined(label)) { 1266 if (family == PF_UNIX) 1267 error = aa_unix_create_perm(label, family, type, 1268 protocol); 1269 else 1270 error = aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, OP_CREATE, 1271 AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, 1272 protocol); 1273 } 1274 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1275 1276 return error; 1277} 1278 1279/** 1280 * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct 1281 * @sock: socket that is being setup 1282 * @family: family of socket being created 1283 * @type: type of the socket 1284 * @protocol: protocol of the socket 1285 * @kern: socket is a special kernel socket 1286 * 1287 * Note: 1288 * - kernel sockets labeled kernel_t used to use unconfined 1289 * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or 1290 * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in 1291 * sock_graft. 1292 */ 1293static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 1294 int type, int protocol, int kern) 1295{ 1296 struct aa_label *label; 1297 1298 if (kern) { 1299 label = aa_get_label(kernel_t); 1300 } else 1301 label = aa_get_current_label(); 1302 1303 if (sock->sk) { 1304 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk); 1305 1306 /* still not live */ 1307 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true)); 1308 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); 1309 } 1310 aa_put_label(label); 1311 1312 return 0; 1313} 1314 1315static int apparmor_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, 1316 struct socket *sockb) 1317{ 1318 struct aa_sk_ctx *a_ctx = aa_sock(socka->sk); 1319 struct aa_sk_ctx *b_ctx = aa_sock(sockb->sk); 1320 struct aa_label *label; 1321 1322 /* socks not live yet - initial values set in sk_alloc */ 1323 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1324 if (rcu_access_pointer(a_ctx->label) != label) { 1325 AA_BUG("a_ctx != label"); 1326 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(a_ctx->label, true)); 1327 rcu_assign_pointer(a_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); 1328 } 1329 if (rcu_access_pointer(b_ctx->label) != label) { 1330 AA_BUG("b_ctx != label"); 1331 aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(b_ctx->label, true)); 1332 rcu_assign_pointer(b_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); 1333 } 1334 1335 if (socka->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) { 1336 /* unix socket pairs by-pass unix_stream_connect */ 1337 unix_connect_peers(a_ctx, b_ctx); 1338 } 1339 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1340 1341 return 0; 1342} 1343 1344/** 1345 * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket 1346 * @sock: socket to bind the address to (must be non-NULL) 1347 * @address: address that is being bound (must be non-NULL) 1348 * @addrlen: length of @address 1349 * 1350 * Performs security checks before allowing a socket to bind to an address. 1351 * Handles Unix domain sockets specially through aa_unix_bind_perm(). 1352 * For other socket families, uses generic permission check via aa_sk_perm(). 1353 * 1354 * Return: 1355 * 0 if binding is permitted 1356 * error code on denial or invalid parameters 1357 */ 1358static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 1359 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 1360{ 1361 AA_BUG(!sock); 1362 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1363 AA_BUG(!address); 1364 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1365 1366 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1367 return aa_unix_bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen); 1368 return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk); 1369} 1370 1371static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 1372 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 1373{ 1374 AA_BUG(!sock); 1375 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1376 AA_BUG(!address); 1377 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1378 1379 /* PF_UNIX goes through unix_stream_connect && unix_may_send */ 1380 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1381 return 0; 1382 return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); 1383} 1384 1385static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 1386{ 1387 AA_BUG(!sock); 1388 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1389 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1390 1391 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1392 return aa_unix_listen_perm(sock, backlog); 1393 return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk); 1394} 1395 1396/* 1397 * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept 1398 * has not been done. 1399 */ 1400static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 1401{ 1402 AA_BUG(!sock); 1403 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1404 AA_BUG(!newsock); 1405 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1406 1407 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1408 return aa_unix_accept_perm(sock, newsock); 1409 return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk); 1410} 1411 1412static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, 1413 struct msghdr *msg, int size) 1414{ 1415 AA_BUG(!sock); 1416 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1417 AA_BUG(!msg); 1418 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1419 1420 /* PF_UNIX goes through unix_may_send */ 1421 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1422 return 0; 1423 return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); 1424} 1425 1426static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, 1427 struct msghdr *msg, int size) 1428{ 1429 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); 1430} 1431 1432static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, 1433 struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) 1434{ 1435 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); 1436} 1437 1438/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ 1439static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) 1440{ 1441 AA_BUG(!sock); 1442 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1443 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1444 1445 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1446 return aa_unix_sock_perm(op, request, sock); 1447 return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); 1448} 1449 1450static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 1451{ 1452 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); 1453} 1454 1455static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 1456{ 1457 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); 1458} 1459 1460/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ 1461static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, 1462 int level, int optname) 1463{ 1464 AA_BUG(!sock); 1465 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1466 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1467 1468 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) 1469 return aa_unix_opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname); 1470 return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); 1471} 1472 1473static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, 1474 int optname) 1475{ 1476 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, 1477 level, optname); 1478} 1479 1480static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, 1481 int optname) 1482{ 1483 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, 1484 level, optname); 1485} 1486 1487static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 1488{ 1489 return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); 1490} 1491 1492#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1493/** 1494 * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk 1495 * @sk: sk to associate @skb with 1496 * @skb: skb to check for perms 1497 * 1498 * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held 1499 * 1500 * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() 1501 * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() 1502 */ 1503static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 1504{ 1505 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1506 int error; 1507 1508 if (!skb->secmark) 1509 return 0; 1510 1511 /* 1512 * If reach here before socket_post_create hook is called, in which 1513 * case label is null, drop the packet. 1514 */ 1515 if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)) 1516 return -EACCES; 1517 1518 rcu_read_lock(); 1519 error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_RECVMSG, 1520 AA_MAY_RECEIVE, skb->secmark, sk); 1521 rcu_read_unlock(); 1522 1523 return error; 1524} 1525#endif 1526 1527 1528static struct aa_label *sk_peer_get_label(struct sock *sk) 1529{ 1530 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1531 struct aa_label *label = ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); 1532 1533 if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer)) 1534 return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer); 1535 1536 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) 1537 return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); 1538 1539 return label; 1540} 1541 1542/** 1543 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer 1544 * @sock: socket that we are trying to get the peer context of 1545 * @optval: output - buffer to copy peer name to 1546 * @optlen: output - size of copied name in @optval 1547 * @len: size of @optval buffer 1548 * Returns: 0 on success, -errno of failure 1549 * 1550 * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan 1551 */ 1552static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, 1553 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen, 1554 unsigned int len) 1555{ 1556 char *name = NULL; 1557 int slen, error = 0; 1558 struct aa_label *label; 1559 struct aa_label *peer; 1560 1561 peer = sk_peer_get_label(sock->sk); 1562 if (IS_ERR(peer)) { 1563 error = PTR_ERR(peer); 1564 goto done; 1565 } 1566 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1567 slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, 1568 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | 1569 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); 1570 /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ 1571 if (slen < 0) { 1572 error = -ENOMEM; 1573 goto done_put; 1574 } 1575 if (slen > len) { 1576 error = -ERANGE; 1577 goto done_len; 1578 } 1579 1580 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen)) 1581 error = -EFAULT; 1582done_len: 1583 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen))) 1584 error = -EFAULT; 1585 1586done_put: 1587 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1588 aa_put_label(peer); 1589done: 1590 kfree(name); 1591 return error; 1592} 1593 1594/** 1595 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet 1596 * @sock: the peer socket 1597 * @skb: packet data 1598 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet 1599 * 1600 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent 1601 */ 1602static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 1603 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 1604 1605{ 1606 /* TODO: requires secid support */ 1607 return -ENOPROTOOPT; 1608} 1609 1610/** 1611 * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket 1612 * @sk: child sock 1613 * @parent: parent socket 1614 * 1615 * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can 1616 * just set sk security information off of current creating process label 1617 * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based 1618 * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled 1619 * socket is shared by different tasks. 1620 */ 1621static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 1622{ 1623 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1624 1625 /* setup - not live */ 1626 if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)) 1627 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_current_label()); 1628} 1629 1630#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1631static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, 1632 struct request_sock *req) 1633{ 1634 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1635 int error; 1636 1637 if (!skb->secmark) 1638 return 0; 1639 1640 rcu_read_lock(); 1641 error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_CONNECT, 1642 AA_MAY_CONNECT, skb->secmark, sk); 1643 rcu_read_unlock(); 1644 1645 return error; 1646} 1647#endif 1648 1649/* 1650 * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label. 1651 */ 1652struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { 1653 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *), 1654 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), 1655 .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), 1656 .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), 1657}; 1658 1659static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = { 1660 .name = "apparmor", 1661 .id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 1662}; 1663 1664static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { 1665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), 1666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), 1667 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), 1668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), 1669 1670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount), 1671 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), 1672 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), 1673 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), 1674 1675 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), 1676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), 1677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), 1678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), 1679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), 1680 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), 1681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), 1682 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), 1683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), 1684 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), 1685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), 1686 1687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), 1688 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive), 1689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), 1690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), 1691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), 1692 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), 1693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), 1694 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), 1695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate), 1696 1697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, apparmor_getselfattr), 1698 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, apparmor_setselfattr), 1699 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), 1700 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), 1701 1702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), 1703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), 1704 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), 1705 1706 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect), 1707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send), 1708 1709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), 1710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), 1711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, apparmor_socket_socketpair), 1712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), 1713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), 1714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), 1715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), 1716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), 1717 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), 1718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), 1719 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), 1720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), 1721 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), 1722 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), 1723#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), 1725#endif 1726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, 1727 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), 1728 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, 1729 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), 1730 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), 1731#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), 1733#endif 1734 1735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), 1736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), 1737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), 1738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), 1739 1740 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), 1741 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), 1742 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), 1743 1744 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), 1745 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), 1746 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, 1747 apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj), 1748 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj), 1749 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), 1750 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), 1751 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create), 1752 1753#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 1754 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init), 1755 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known), 1756 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match), 1757 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free), 1758#endif 1759 1760 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), 1761 LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx), 1762 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), 1763 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), 1764 1765#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 1766 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds), 1767 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll), 1768#endif 1769}; 1770 1771/* 1772 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters 1773 */ 1774 1775static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1776static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1777#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool 1778static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { 1779 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, 1780 .set = param_set_aabool, 1781 .get = param_get_aabool 1782}; 1783 1784static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1785static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1786#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint 1787static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { 1788 .set = param_set_aauint, 1789 .get = param_get_aauint 1790}; 1791 1792static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, 1793 const struct kernel_param *kp); 1794static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, 1795 const struct kernel_param *kp); 1796#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int 1797static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = { 1798 .set = param_set_aacompressionlevel, 1799 .get = param_get_aacompressionlevel 1800}; 1801 1802static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1803static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1804#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool 1805static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { 1806 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, 1807 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, 1808 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy 1809}; 1810 1811static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1812static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1813 1814static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1815static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1816 1817static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1818static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1819 1820/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters 1821 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. 1822 */ 1823 1824/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ 1825enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; 1826module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, 1827 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1828 1829/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ 1830bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); 1831#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH 1832module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1833#endif 1834 1835/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */ 1836bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY); 1837#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY 1838module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600); 1839#endif 1840 1841/* policy loaddata compression level */ 1842int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL; 1843module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, 1844 aacompressionlevel, 0400); 1845 1846/* Debug mode */ 1847int aa_g_debug; 1848module_param_call(debug, param_set_debug, param_get_debug, 1849 &aa_g_debug, 0600); 1850 1851/* Audit mode */ 1852enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; 1853module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, 1854 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1855 1856/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This 1857 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running 1858 */ 1859bool aa_g_audit_header = true; 1860module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 1861 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1862 1863/* lock out loading/removal of policy 1864 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to 1865 * load policy, if lock_policy is set 1866 */ 1867bool aa_g_lock_policy; 1868module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 1869 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1870 1871/* Syscall logging mode */ 1872bool aa_g_logsyscall; 1873module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1874 1875/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ 1876unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; 1877module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); 1878 1879/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification 1880 * on the loaded policy is done. 1881 * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now 1882 * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. 1883 */ 1884bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD); 1885module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); 1886 1887static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1888static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1889#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int 1890static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = { 1891 .set = param_set_aaintbool, 1892 .get = param_get_aaintbool 1893}; 1894/* Boot time disable flag */ 1895static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1; 1896module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444); 1897 1898static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) 1899{ 1900 unsigned long enabled; 1901 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); 1902 if (!error) 1903 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; 1904 return 1; 1905} 1906 1907__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); 1908 1909/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ 1910static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1911{ 1912 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1913 return -EINVAL; 1914 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 1915 return -EPERM; 1916 return param_set_bool(val, kp); 1917} 1918 1919static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1920{ 1921 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1922 return -EINVAL; 1923 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1924 return -EPERM; 1925 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); 1926} 1927 1928static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1929{ 1930 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1931 return -EINVAL; 1932 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 1933 return -EPERM; 1934 return param_set_bool(val, kp); 1935} 1936 1937static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1938{ 1939 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1940 return -EINVAL; 1941 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1942 return -EPERM; 1943 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); 1944} 1945 1946static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1947{ 1948 int error; 1949 1950 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1951 return -EINVAL; 1952 /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */ 1953 if (apparmor_initialized) 1954 return -EPERM; 1955 1956 error = param_set_uint(val, kp); 1957 aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer)); 1958 pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max); 1959 1960 return error; 1961} 1962 1963static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1964{ 1965 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1966 return -EINVAL; 1967 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1968 return -EPERM; 1969 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); 1970} 1971 1972/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */ 1973static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1974{ 1975 struct kernel_param kp_local; 1976 bool value; 1977 int error; 1978 1979 if (apparmor_initialized) 1980 return -EPERM; 1981 1982 /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ 1983 value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); 1984 memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); 1985 kp_local.arg = &value; 1986 1987 error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local); 1988 if (!error) 1989 *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg); 1990 return error; 1991} 1992 1993/* 1994 * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to 1995 * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for 1996 * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM 1997 * infrastructure. 1998 */ 1999static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2000{ 2001 struct kernel_param kp_local; 2002 bool value; 2003 2004 /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ 2005 value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); 2006 memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); 2007 kp_local.arg = &value; 2008 2009 return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local); 2010} 2011 2012static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, 2013 const struct kernel_param *kp) 2014{ 2015 int error; 2016 2017 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2018 return -EINVAL; 2019 if (apparmor_initialized) 2020 return -EPERM; 2021 2022 error = param_set_int(val, kp); 2023 2024 aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, 2025 AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL); 2026 pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n", 2027 aa_g_rawdata_compression_level); 2028 2029 return error; 2030} 2031 2032static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, 2033 const struct kernel_param *kp) 2034{ 2035 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2036 return -EINVAL; 2037 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 2038 return -EPERM; 2039 return param_get_int(buffer, kp); 2040} 2041 2042static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2043{ 2044 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2045 return -EINVAL; 2046 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 2047 return -EPERM; 2048 return aa_print_debug_params(buffer); 2049} 2050 2051static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2052{ 2053 int i; 2054 2055 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2056 return -EINVAL; 2057 if (!val) 2058 return -EINVAL; 2059 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 2060 return -EPERM; 2061 2062 i = aa_parse_debug_params(val); 2063 if (i == DEBUG_PARSE_ERROR) 2064 return -EINVAL; 2065 2066 aa_g_debug = i; 2067 return 0; 2068} 2069 2070static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2071{ 2072 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2073 return -EINVAL; 2074 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 2075 return -EPERM; 2076 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); 2077} 2078 2079static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2080{ 2081 int i; 2082 2083 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2084 return -EINVAL; 2085 if (!val) 2086 return -EINVAL; 2087 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 2088 return -EPERM; 2089 2090 i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val); 2091 if (i < 0) 2092 return -EINVAL; 2093 2094 aa_g_audit = i; 2095 return 0; 2096} 2097 2098static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2099{ 2100 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2101 return -EINVAL; 2102 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 2103 return -EPERM; 2104 2105 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); 2106} 2107 2108static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 2109{ 2110 int i; 2111 2112 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2113 return -EINVAL; 2114 if (!val) 2115 return -EINVAL; 2116 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 2117 return -EPERM; 2118 2119 i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX, 2120 val); 2121 if (i < 0) 2122 return -EINVAL; 2123 2124 aa_g_profile_mode = i; 2125 return 0; 2126} 2127 2128char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic) 2129{ 2130 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 2131 struct aa_local_cache *cache; 2132 bool try_again = true; 2133 gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); 2134 2135 /* use per cpu cached buffers first */ 2136 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2137 if (!list_empty(&cache->head)) { 2138 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list); 2139 list_del(&aa_buf->list); 2140 if (cache->hold) 2141 cache->hold--; 2142 cache->count--; 2143 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2144 return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; 2145 } 2146 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2147 2148 if (!spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) { 2149 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2150 cache->hold += 1; 2151 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2152 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2153 } else { 2154 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2155 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2156 } 2157retry: 2158 if (buffer_count > reserve_count || 2159 (in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) { 2160 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, 2161 list); 2162 list_del(&aa_buf->list); 2163 buffer_count--; 2164 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2165 return aa_buf->buffer; 2166 } 2167 if (in_atomic) { 2168 /* 2169 * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase 2170 * how many buffers to keep in reserve 2171 */ 2172 reserve_count++; 2173 flags = GFP_ATOMIC; 2174 } 2175 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2176 2177 if (!in_atomic) 2178 might_sleep(); 2179 aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags); 2180 if (!aa_buf) { 2181 if (try_again) { 2182 try_again = false; 2183 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2184 goto retry; 2185 } 2186 pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n"); 2187 return NULL; 2188 } 2189 return aa_buf->buffer; 2190} 2191 2192void aa_put_buffer(char *buf) 2193{ 2194 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 2195 struct aa_local_cache *cache; 2196 2197 if (!buf) 2198 return; 2199 aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]); 2200 2201 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2202 if (!cache->hold) { 2203 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2204 2205 if (spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) { 2206 /* put back on global list */ 2207 list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers); 2208 buffer_count++; 2209 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2210 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2211 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2212 return; 2213 } 2214 /* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */ 2215 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2216 cache->hold += 1; 2217 } 2218 2219 /* cache in percpu list */ 2220 list_add(&aa_buf->list, &cache->head); 2221 cache->count++; 2222 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 2223} 2224 2225/* 2226 * AppArmor init functions 2227 */ 2228 2229/** 2230 * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task. 2231 * 2232 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined 2233 */ 2234static int __init set_init_ctx(void) 2235{ 2236 struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred; 2237 2238 set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns))); 2239 2240 return 0; 2241} 2242 2243static void destroy_buffers(void) 2244{ 2245 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 2246 2247 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2248 while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) { 2249 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, 2250 list); 2251 list_del(&aa_buf->list); 2252 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2253 kfree(aa_buf); 2254 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2255 } 2256 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 2257} 2258 2259static int __init alloc_buffers(void) 2260{ 2261 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 2262 int i, num; 2263 2264 /* 2265 * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce 2266 * lock contention 2267 */ 2268 for_each_possible_cpu(i) { 2269 per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0; 2270 per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0; 2271 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head); 2272 } 2273 /* 2274 * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are 2275 * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers 2276 * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more 2277 * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. 2278 * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be 2279 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high. 2280 */ 2281 if (num_online_cpus() > 1) 2282 num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; 2283 else 2284 num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT; 2285 2286 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { 2287 2288 aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL | 2289 __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); 2290 if (!aa_buf) { 2291 destroy_buffers(); 2292 return -ENOMEM; 2293 } 2294 aa_put_buffer(aa_buf->buffer); 2295 } 2296 return 0; 2297} 2298 2299#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL 2300static int apparmor_dointvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, 2301 void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) 2302{ 2303 if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 2304 return -EPERM; 2305 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2306 return -EINVAL; 2307 2308 return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); 2309} 2310 2311static const struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { 2312#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS 2313 { 2314 .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy", 2315 .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, 2316 .maxlen = sizeof(int), 2317 .mode = 0600, 2318 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, 2319 }, 2320#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */ 2321 { 2322 .procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode", 2323 .data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode, 2324 .maxlen = sizeof(int), 2325 .mode = 0600, 2326 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, 2327 }, 2328 { 2329 .procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined", 2330 .data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted, 2331 .maxlen = sizeof(int), 2332 .mode = 0600, 2333 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, 2334 }, 2335}; 2336 2337static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void) 2338{ 2339 return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; 2340} 2341#else 2342static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void) 2343{ 2344 return 0; 2345} 2346#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ 2347 2348#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) 2349static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, 2350 struct sk_buff *skb, 2351 const struct nf_hook_state *state) 2352{ 2353 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; 2354 struct sock *sk; 2355 int error; 2356 2357 if (!skb->secmark) 2358 return NF_ACCEPT; 2359 2360 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); 2361 if (sk == NULL) 2362 return NF_ACCEPT; 2363 2364 ctx = aa_sock(sk); 2365 rcu_read_lock(); 2366 error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_SENDMSG, 2367 AA_MAY_SEND, skb->secmark, sk); 2368 rcu_read_unlock(); 2369 if (!error) 2370 return NF_ACCEPT; 2371 2372 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); 2373 2374} 2375 2376static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { 2377 { 2378 .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, 2379 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, 2380 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, 2381 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, 2382 }, 2383#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) 2384 { 2385 .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, 2386 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, 2387 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, 2388 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, 2389 }, 2390#endif 2391}; 2392 2393static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net) 2394{ 2395 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, 2396 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); 2397} 2398 2399static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net) 2400{ 2401 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, 2402 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); 2403} 2404 2405static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = { 2406 .init = apparmor_nf_register, 2407 .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister, 2408}; 2409 2410static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) 2411{ 2412 int err; 2413 2414 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2415 return 0; 2416 2417 err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops); 2418 if (err) 2419 panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); 2420 2421 return 0; 2422} 2423#endif 2424 2425static char nulldfa_src[] __aligned(8) = { 2426 #include "nulldfa.in" 2427}; 2428static struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; 2429 2430static char stacksplitdfa_src[] __aligned(8) = { 2431 #include "stacksplitdfa.in" 2432}; 2433struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; 2434struct aa_policydb *nullpdb; 2435 2436static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) 2437{ 2438 int error = -ENOMEM; 2439 2440 nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL); 2441 if (!nullpdb) 2442 return -ENOMEM; 2443 2444 nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src), 2445 TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | 2446 TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); 2447 if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) { 2448 error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa); 2449 goto fail; 2450 } 2451 nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); 2452 nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL); 2453 if (!nullpdb->perms) 2454 goto fail; 2455 nullpdb->size = 2; 2456 2457 stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src, 2458 sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src), 2459 TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | 2460 TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); 2461 if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) { 2462 error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa); 2463 goto fail; 2464 } 2465 2466 return 0; 2467 2468fail: 2469 aa_put_pdb(nullpdb); 2470 aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); 2471 nullpdb = NULL; 2472 nulldfa = NULL; 2473 stacksplitdfa = NULL; 2474 2475 return error; 2476} 2477 2478static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void) 2479{ 2480 aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa); 2481 aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); 2482 aa_put_pdb(nullpdb); 2483 nullpdb = NULL; 2484 stacksplitdfa = NULL; 2485 nulldfa = NULL; 2486} 2487 2488static int __init apparmor_init(void) 2489{ 2490 int error; 2491 2492 error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); 2493 if (error) { 2494 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n"); 2495 goto alloc_out; 2496 } 2497 2498 error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); 2499 if (error) { 2500 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); 2501 goto alloc_out; 2502 } 2503 2504 error = apparmor_init_sysctl(); 2505 if (error) { 2506 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n"); 2507 goto alloc_out; 2508 2509 } 2510 2511 error = alloc_buffers(); 2512 if (error) { 2513 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n"); 2514 goto alloc_out; 2515 } 2516 2517 error = set_init_ctx(); 2518 if (error) { 2519 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); 2520 aa_free_root_ns(); 2521 goto buffers_out; 2522 } 2523 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), 2524 &apparmor_lsmid); 2525 2526 /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ 2527 audit_cfg_lsm(&apparmor_lsmid, AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT); 2528 2529 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ 2530 apparmor_initialized = 1; 2531 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) 2532 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); 2533 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) 2534 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); 2535 else 2536 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); 2537 2538 return error; 2539 2540buffers_out: 2541 destroy_buffers(); 2542alloc_out: 2543 aa_destroy_aafs(); 2544 aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); 2545 2546 apparmor_enabled = false; 2547 return error; 2548} 2549 2550DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { 2551 .id = &apparmor_lsmid, 2552 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, 2553 .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, 2554 .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, 2555 .init = apparmor_init, 2556 .initcall_fs = aa_create_aafs, 2557#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) 2558 .initcall_device = apparmor_nf_ip_init, 2559#endif 2560#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH 2561 .initcall_late = init_profile_hash, 2562#endif 2563};
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