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mseal.c

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linux-6.19.14/mm/mseal.c C
  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
  2/*
  3 *  Implement mseal() syscall.
  4 *
  5 *  Copyright (c) 2023,2024 Google, Inc.
  6 *
  7 *  Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
  8 */
  9
 10#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
 11#include <linux/mman.h>
 12#include <linux/mm.h>
 13#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
 14#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 15#include <linux/sched.h>
 16#include "internal.h"
 17
 18/*
 19 * mseal() disallows an input range which contain unmapped ranges (VMA holes).
 20 *
 21 * It disallows unmapped regions from start to end whether they exist at the
 22 * start, in the middle, or at the end of the range, or any combination thereof.
 23 *
 24 * This is because after sealng a range, there's nothing to stop memory mapping
 25 * of ranges in the remaining gaps later, meaning that the user might then
 26 * wrongly consider the entirety of the mseal()'d range to be sealed when it
 27 * in fact isn't.
 28 */
 29
 30/*
 31 * Does the [start, end) range contain any unmapped memory?
 32 *
 33 * We ensure that:
 34 * - start is part of a valid VMA.
 35 * - end is part of a valid VMA.
 36 * - no gap (unallocated memory) exists between start and end.
 37 */
 38static bool range_contains_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm,
 39		unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 40{
 41	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 42	unsigned long prev_end = start;
 43	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
 44
 45	for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
 46		if (vma->vm_start > prev_end)
 47			return true;
 48
 49		prev_end = vma->vm_end;
 50	}
 51
 52	return prev_end < end;
 53}
 54
 55static int mseal_apply(struct mm_struct *mm,
 56		unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 57{
 58	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
 59	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
 60
 61	/* We know there are no gaps so this will be non-NULL. */
 62	vma = vma_iter_load(&vmi);
 63	prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
 64	if (start > vma->vm_start)
 65		prev = vma;
 66
 67	for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
 68		const unsigned long curr_start = MAX(vma->vm_start, start);
 69		const unsigned long curr_end = MIN(vma->vm_end, end);
 70
 71		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SEALED)) {
 72			vm_flags_t vm_flags = vma->vm_flags | VM_SEALED;
 73
 74			vma = vma_modify_flags(&vmi, prev, vma, curr_start,
 75					       curr_end, &vm_flags);
 76			if (IS_ERR(vma))
 77				return PTR_ERR(vma);
 78			vm_flags_set(vma, VM_SEALED);
 79		}
 80
 81		prev = vma;
 82	}
 83
 84	return 0;
 85}
 86
 87/*
 88 * mseal(2) seals the VM's meta data from
 89 * selected syscalls.
 90 *
 91 * addr/len: VM address range.
 92 *
 93 *  The address range by addr/len must meet:
 94 *   start (addr) must be in a valid VMA.
 95 *   end (addr + len) must be in a valid VMA.
 96 *   no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
 97 *   start (addr) must be page aligned.
 98 *
 99 *  len: len will be page aligned implicitly.
100 *
101 *   Below VMA operations are blocked after sealing.
102 *   1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking
103 *	the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty
104 *	space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new
105 *	set of attributes.
106 *   2> Moving or expanding a different vma into the current location,
107 *	via mremap().
108 *   3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
109 *   4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
110 *	specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
111 *	the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
112 *	merging to expand a sealed VMA.
113 *   5> mprotect and pkey_mprotect.
114 *   6> Some destructive madvice() behavior (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
115 *      for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
116 *	memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
117 *	effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
118 *
119 *  flags: reserved.
120 *
121 * return values:
122 *  zero: success.
123 *  -EINVAL:
124 *   invalid input flags.
125 *   start address is not page aligned.
126 *   Address arange (start + len) overflow.
127 *  -ENOMEM:
128 *   addr is not a valid address (not allocated).
129 *   end (start + len) is not a valid address.
130 *   a gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
131 *  -EPERM:
132 *  - In 32 bit architecture, sealing is not supported.
133 * Note:
134 *  user can call mseal(2) multiple times, adding a seal on an
135 *  already sealed memory is a no-action (no error).
136 *
137 *  unseal() is not supported.
138 */
139int do_mseal(unsigned long start, size_t len_in, unsigned long flags)
140{
141	size_t len;
142	int ret = 0;
143	unsigned long end;
144	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
145
146	/* Verify flags not set. */
147	if (flags)
148		return -EINVAL;
149
150	start = untagged_addr(start);
151	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start))
152		return -EINVAL;
153
154	len = PAGE_ALIGN(len_in);
155	/* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero. */
156	if (len_in && !len)
157		return -EINVAL;
158
159	end = start + len;
160	if (end < start)
161		return -EINVAL;
162
163	if (end == start)
164		return 0;
165
166	if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
167		return -EINTR;
168
169	if (range_contains_unmapped(mm, start, end)) {
170		ret = -ENOMEM;
171		goto out;
172	}
173
174	/*
175	 * Second pass, this should success, unless there are errors
176	 * from vma_modify_flags, e.g. merge/split error, or process
177	 * reaching the max supported VMAs, however, those cases shall
178	 * be rare.
179	 */
180	ret = mseal_apply(mm, start, end);
181
182out:
183	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
184	return ret;
185}
186
187SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
188		flags)
189{
190	return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
191}
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