auditsc.c

   1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
   2/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
   3 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
   4 *
   5 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
   6 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
   7 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
   8 * All Rights Reserved.
   9 *
  10 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
  11 *
  12 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
  13 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
  14 *
  15 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
  16 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
  17 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
  18 *
  19 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
  20 * 2006.
  21 *
  22 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
  23 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
  24 *
  25 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
  26 * filesystem information.
  27 *
  28 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
  29 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
  30 */
  31
  32#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  33
  34#include <linux/init.h>
  35#include <asm/types.h>
  36#include <linux/atomic.h>
  37#include <linux/fs.h>
  38#include <linux/namei.h>
  39#include <linux/mm.h>
  40#include <linux/export.h>
  41#include <linux/slab.h>
  42#include <linux/mount.h>
  43#include <linux/socket.h>
  44#include <linux/mqueue.h>
  45#include <linux/audit.h>
  46#include <linux/personality.h>
  47#include <linux/time.h>
  48#include <linux/netlink.h>
  49#include <linux/compiler.h>
  50#include <asm/unistd.h>
  51#include <linux/security.h>
  52#include <linux/list.h>
  53#include <linux/binfmts.h>
  54#include <linux/highmem.h>
  55#include <linux/syscalls.h>
  56#include <asm/syscall.h>
  57#include <linux/capability.h>
  58#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
  59#include <linux/compat.h>
  60#include <linux/ctype.h>
  61#include <linux/string.h>
  62#include <linux/uaccess.h>
  63#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
  64#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
  65#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
  66#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
  67#include <uapi/linux/fanotify.h>
  68
  69#include "audit.h"
  70
  71/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
  72#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
  73#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
  74#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
  75
  76/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
  77 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
  78#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
  79
  80/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
  81#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
  82
  83/* number of audit rules */
  84int audit_n_rules;
  85
  86/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
  87int audit_signals;
  88
  89struct audit_aux_data {
  90	struct audit_aux_data	*next;
  91	int			type;
  92};
  93
  94/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
  95#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS	16
  96
  97struct audit_aux_data_pids {
  98	struct audit_aux_data	d;
  99	pid_t			target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 100	kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 101	kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 102	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 103	struct lsm_prop		target_ref[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 104	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
 105	int			pid_count;
 106};
 107
 108struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
 109	struct audit_aux_data	d;
 110	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
 111	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
 112	struct audit_cap_data	old_pcap;
 113	struct audit_cap_data	new_pcap;
 114};
 115
 116struct audit_tree_refs {
 117	struct audit_tree_refs *next;
 118	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
 119};
 120
 121struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
 122	enum audit_nfcfgop	op;
 123	const char		*s;
 124};
 125
 126static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
 127	{ AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER,			"xt_register"		   },
 128	{ AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE,			"xt_replace"		   },
 129	{ AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER,		"xt_unregister"		   },
 130	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER,		"nft_register_table"	   },
 131	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER,	"nft_unregister_table"	   },
 132	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER,		"nft_register_chain"	   },
 133	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER,	"nft_unregister_chain"	   },
 134	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER,		"nft_register_rule"	   },
 135	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER,		"nft_unregister_rule"	   },
 136	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER,		"nft_register_set"	   },
 137	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER,		"nft_unregister_set"	   },
 138	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER,	"nft_register_setelem"	   },
 139	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER,	"nft_unregister_setelem"   },
 140	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER,		"nft_register_gen"	   },
 141	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER,		"nft_register_obj"	   },
 142	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER,		"nft_unregister_obj"	   },
 143	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET,		"nft_reset_obj"		   },
 144	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER,	"nft_register_flowtable"   },
 145	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER,	"nft_unregister_flowtable" },
 146	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_RESET,		"nft_reset_setelem"        },
 147	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_RESET,		"nft_reset_rule"           },
 148	{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,			"nft_invalid"		   },
 149};
 150
 151static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 152{
 153	unsigned n;
 154
 155	if (unlikely(!ctx))
 156		return 0;
 157	n = ctx->major;
 158
 159	switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
 160	case AUDITSC_NATIVE:
 161		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
 162		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
 163			return 1;
 164		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
 165		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
 166			return 1;
 167		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
 168		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
 169			return 1;
 170		return 0;
 171	case AUDITSC_COMPAT: /* 32bit on biarch */
 172		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
 173		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
 174			return 1;
 175		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
 176		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
 177			return 1;
 178		if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
 179		     audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
 180			return 1;
 181		return 0;
 182	case AUDITSC_OPEN:
 183		return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
 184	case AUDITSC_OPENAT:
 185		return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
 186	case AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL:
 187		return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
 188	case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
 189		return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
 190	case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
 191		return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags);
 192	default:
 193		return 0;
 194	}
 195}
 196
 197static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
 198{
 199	struct audit_names *n;
 200	umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
 201
 202	if (unlikely(!ctx))
 203		return 0;
 204
 205	list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 206		if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
 207		    ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
 208			return 1;
 209	}
 210
 211	return 0;
 212}
 213
 214/*
 215 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
 216 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
 217 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
 218 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
 219 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards.  We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
 220 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
 221 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
 222 */
 223
 224static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
 225{
 226	if (!ctx->prio) {
 227		ctx->prio = 1;
 228		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
 229	}
 230}
 231
 232static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 233{
 234	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
 235	int left = ctx->tree_count;
 236
 237	if (likely(left)) {
 238		p->c[--left] = chunk;
 239		ctx->tree_count = left;
 240		return 1;
 241	}
 242	if (!p)
 243		return 0;
 244	p = p->next;
 245	if (p) {
 246		p->c[30] = chunk;
 247		ctx->trees = p;
 248		ctx->tree_count = 30;
 249		return 1;
 250	}
 251	return 0;
 252}
 253
 254static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
 255{
 256	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
 257
 258	ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
 259	if (!ctx->trees) {
 260		ctx->trees = p;
 261		return 0;
 262	}
 263	if (p)
 264		p->next = ctx->trees;
 265	else
 266		ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
 267	ctx->tree_count = 31;
 268	return 1;
 269}
 270
 271static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
 272		      struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
 273{
 274	struct audit_tree_refs *q;
 275	int n;
 276
 277	if (!p) {
 278		/* we started with empty chain */
 279		p = ctx->first_trees;
 280		count = 31;
 281		/* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
 282		if (!p)
 283			return;
 284	}
 285	n = count;
 286	for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
 287		while (n--) {
 288			audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
 289			q->c[n] = NULL;
 290		}
 291	}
 292	while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
 293		audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
 294		q->c[n] = NULL;
 295	}
 296	ctx->trees = p;
 297	ctx->tree_count = count;
 298}
 299
 300static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
 301{
 302	struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
 303
 304	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
 305		q = p->next;
 306		kfree(p);
 307	}
 308}
 309
 310static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
 311{
 312	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
 313	int n;
 314
 315	if (!tree)
 316		return 0;
 317	/* full ones */
 318	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
 319		for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
 320			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
 321				return 1;
 322	}
 323	/* partial */
 324	if (p) {
 325		for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
 326			if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
 327				return 1;
 328	}
 329	return 0;
 330}
 331
 332static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
 333			     struct audit_names *name,
 334			     struct audit_field *f,
 335			     struct audit_context *ctx)
 336{
 337	struct audit_names *n;
 338	int rc;
 339
 340	if (name) {
 341		rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
 342		if (rc)
 343			return rc;
 344	}
 345
 346	if (ctx) {
 347		list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 348			rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
 349			if (rc)
 350				return rc;
 351		}
 352	}
 353	return 0;
 354}
 355
 356static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
 357			     struct audit_names *name,
 358			     struct audit_field *f,
 359			     struct audit_context *ctx)
 360{
 361	struct audit_names *n;
 362	int rc;
 363
 364	if (name) {
 365		rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
 366		if (rc)
 367			return rc;
 368	}
 369
 370	if (ctx) {
 371		list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 372			rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
 373			if (rc)
 374				return rc;
 375		}
 376	}
 377	return 0;
 378}
 379
 380static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
 381			       const struct cred *cred,
 382			       struct audit_field *f,
 383			       struct audit_context *ctx,
 384			       struct audit_names *name)
 385{
 386	switch (f->val) {
 387	/* process to file object comparisons */
 388	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
 389		return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
 390	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
 391		return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
 392	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
 393		return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
 394	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
 395		return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
 396	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
 397		return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
 398	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
 399		return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
 400	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
 401		return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
 402	case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
 403		return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
 404	case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
 405		return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
 406	/* uid comparisons */
 407	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
 408		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
 409					    audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
 410	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
 411		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
 412	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
 413		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
 414	case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
 415		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
 416	/* auid comparisons */
 417	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
 418		return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
 419					    cred->euid);
 420	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
 421		return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
 422					    cred->suid);
 423	case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
 424		return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
 425					    cred->fsuid);
 426	/* euid comparisons */
 427	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
 428		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
 429	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
 430		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
 431	/* suid comparisons */
 432	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
 433		return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
 434	/* gid comparisons */
 435	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
 436		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
 437	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
 438		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
 439	case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
 440		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
 441	/* egid comparisons */
 442	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
 443		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
 444	case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
 445		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
 446	/* sgid comparison */
 447	case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
 448		return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
 449	default:
 450		WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define.  Report as a bug\n");
 451		return 0;
 452	}
 453	return 0;
 454}
 455
 456/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 457/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
 458 * otherwise.
 459 *
 460 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
 461 * filtering a task rule at task creation time.  This and tsk == current are
 462 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
 463 */
 464static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 465			      struct audit_krule *rule,
 466			      struct audit_context *ctx,
 467			      struct audit_names *name,
 468			      enum audit_state *state,
 469			      bool task_creation)
 470{
 471	const struct cred *cred;
 472	int i, need_sid = 1;
 473	struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 474	unsigned int sessionid;
 475
 476	if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
 477		return 0;
 478
 479	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
 480
 481	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 482		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
 483		struct audit_names *n;
 484		int result = 0;
 485		pid_t pid;
 486
 487		switch (f->type) {
 488		case AUDIT_PID:
 489			pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
 490			result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
 491			break;
 492		case AUDIT_PPID:
 493			if (ctx) {
 494				if (!ctx->ppid)
 495					ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
 496				result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
 497			}
 498			break;
 499		case AUDIT_EXE:
 500			result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
 501			if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
 502				result = !result;
 503			break;
 504		case AUDIT_UID:
 505			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
 506			break;
 507		case AUDIT_EUID:
 508			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
 509			break;
 510		case AUDIT_SUID:
 511			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
 512			break;
 513		case AUDIT_FSUID:
 514			result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
 515			break;
 516		case AUDIT_GID:
 517			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
 518			if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
 519				if (!result)
 520					result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
 521			} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
 522				if (result)
 523					result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
 524			}
 525			break;
 526		case AUDIT_EGID:
 527			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
 528			if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
 529				if (!result)
 530					result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
 531			} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
 532				if (result)
 533					result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
 534			}
 535			break;
 536		case AUDIT_SGID:
 537			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
 538			break;
 539		case AUDIT_FSGID:
 540			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
 541			break;
 542		case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
 543			sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
 544			result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
 545			break;
 546		case AUDIT_PERS:
 547			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
 548			break;
 549		case AUDIT_ARCH:
 550			if (ctx)
 551				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
 552			break;
 553
 554		case AUDIT_EXIT:
 555			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
 556				result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
 557			break;
 558		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
 559			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) {
 560				if (f->val)
 561					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
 562				else
 563					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
 564			}
 565			break;
 566		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
 567			if (name) {
 568				if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
 569				    audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
 570					++result;
 571			} else if (ctx) {
 572				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 573					if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
 574					    audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
 575						++result;
 576						break;
 577					}
 578				}
 579			}
 580			break;
 581		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
 582			if (name) {
 583				if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
 584				    audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
 585					++result;
 586			} else if (ctx) {
 587				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 588					if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
 589					    audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
 590						++result;
 591						break;
 592					}
 593				}
 594			}
 595			break;
 596		case AUDIT_INODE:
 597			if (name)
 598				result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
 599			else if (ctx) {
 600				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 601					if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
 602						++result;
 603						break;
 604					}
 605				}
 606			}
 607			break;
 608		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
 609			if (name) {
 610				result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
 611			} else if (ctx) {
 612				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 613					if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
 614						++result;
 615						break;
 616					}
 617				}
 618			}
 619			break;
 620		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
 621			if (name) {
 622				result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
 623			} else if (ctx) {
 624				list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 625					if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
 626						++result;
 627						break;
 628					}
 629				}
 630			}
 631			break;
 632		case AUDIT_WATCH:
 633			if (name) {
 634				result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
 635							     name->ino,
 636							     name->dev);
 637				if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
 638					result = !result;
 639			}
 640			break;
 641		case AUDIT_DIR:
 642			if (ctx) {
 643				result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
 644				if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
 645					result = !result;
 646			}
 647			break;
 648		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 649			result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
 650						      f->op, f->uid);
 651			break;
 652		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
 653			result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
 654			break;
 655		case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
 656			if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr)
 657				result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
 658							  f->op, f->val);
 659			break;
 660		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 661		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 662		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 663		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
 664		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 665			/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
 666			   a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
 667			   match for now to avoid losing information that
 668			   may be wanted.   An error message will also be
 669			   logged upon error */
 670			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 671				if (need_sid) {
 672					/* @tsk should always be equal to
 673					 * @current with the exception of
 674					 * fork()/copy_process() in which case
 675					 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
 676					 * of @current's creds so we can still
 677					 * use
 678					 * security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
 679					 * here even though it always refs
 680					 * @current's creds
 681					 */
 682					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 683					need_sid = 0;
 684				}
 685				result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop,
 686								   f->type,
 687								   f->op,
 688								   f->lsm_rule);
 689			}
 690			break;
 691		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
 692		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 693		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 694		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
 695		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
 696			/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
 697			   also applies here */
 698			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 699				/* Find files that match */
 700				if (name) {
 701					result = security_audit_rule_match(
 702								&name->oprop,
 703								f->type,
 704								f->op,
 705								f->lsm_rule);
 706				} else if (ctx) {
 707					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 708						if (security_audit_rule_match(
 709								&n->oprop,
 710								f->type,
 711								f->op,
 712								f->lsm_rule)) {
 713							++result;
 714							break;
 715						}
 716					}
 717				}
 718				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 719				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 720					break;
 721				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oprop,
 722							      f->type, f->op,
 723							      f->lsm_rule))
 724					++result;
 725			}
 726			break;
 727		case AUDIT_ARG0:
 728		case AUDIT_ARG1:
 729		case AUDIT_ARG2:
 730		case AUDIT_ARG3:
 731			if (ctx)
 732				result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
 733			break;
 734		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
 735			/* ignore this field for filtering */
 736			result = 1;
 737			break;
 738		case AUDIT_PERM:
 739			result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
 740			if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
 741				result = !result;
 742			break;
 743		case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
 744			result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
 745			if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
 746				result = !result;
 747			break;
 748		case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
 749			result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
 750			break;
 751		}
 752		if (!result)
 753			return 0;
 754	}
 755
 756	if (ctx) {
 757		if (rule->filterkey) {
 758			kfree(ctx->filterkey);
 759			ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 760		}
 761		ctx->prio = rule->prio;
 762	}
 763	switch (rule->action) {
 764	case AUDIT_NEVER:
 765		*state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
 766		break;
 767	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
 768		*state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
 769		break;
 770	}
 771	return 1;
 772}
 773
 774/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
 775 * completely disabled for this task.  Since we only have the task
 776 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
 777 */
 778static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 779{
 780	struct audit_entry *e;
 781	enum audit_state   state;
 782
 783	rcu_read_lock();
 784	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
 785		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
 786				       &state, true)) {
 787			if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
 788				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 789			rcu_read_unlock();
 790			return state;
 791		}
 792	}
 793	rcu_read_unlock();
 794	return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
 795}
 796
 797static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
 798{
 799	int word, bit;
 800
 801	if (val > 0xffffffff)
 802		return false;
 803
 804	word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
 805	if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
 806		return false;
 807
 808	bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
 809
 810	return rule->mask[word] & bit;
 811}
 812
 813/**
 814 * __audit_filter_op - common filter helper for operations (syscall/uring/etc)
 815 * @tsk: associated task
 816 * @ctx: audit context
 817 * @list: audit filter list
 818 * @name: audit_name (can be NULL)
 819 * @op: current syscall/uring_op
 820 *
 821 * Run the udit filters specified in @list against @tsk using @ctx,
 822 * @name, and @op, as necessary; the caller is responsible for ensuring
 823 * that the call is made while the RCU read lock is held. The @name
 824 * parameter can be NULL, but all others must be specified.
 825 * Returns 1/true if the filter finds a match, 0/false if none are found.
 826 */
 827static int __audit_filter_op(struct task_struct *tsk,
 828			   struct audit_context *ctx,
 829			   struct list_head *list,
 830			   struct audit_names *name,
 831			   unsigned long op)
 832{
 833	struct audit_entry *e;
 834	enum audit_state state;
 835
 836	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 837		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, op) &&
 838		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, name,
 839				       &state, false)) {
 840			ctx->current_state = state;
 841			return 1;
 842		}
 843	}
 844	return 0;
 845}
 846
 847/**
 848 * audit_filter_uring - apply filters to an io_uring operation
 849 * @tsk: associated task
 850 * @ctx: audit context
 851 */
 852static void audit_filter_uring(struct task_struct *tsk,
 853			       struct audit_context *ctx)
 854{
 855	if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
 856		return;
 857
 858	rcu_read_lock();
 859	__audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT],
 860			NULL, ctx->uring_op);
 861	rcu_read_unlock();
 862}
 863
 864/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
 865 * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
 866 * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
 867 * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
 868 */
 869static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 870				 struct audit_context *ctx)
 871{
 872	if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
 873		return;
 874
 875	rcu_read_lock();
 876	__audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT],
 877			NULL, ctx->major);
 878	rcu_read_unlock();
 879}
 880
 881/*
 882 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
 883 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
 884 */
 885static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
 886				   struct audit_names *n,
 887				   struct audit_context *ctx)
 888{
 889	int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
 890	struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
 891
 892	return __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, list, n, ctx->major);
 893}
 894
 895/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
 896 * collected during syscall processing.  We only check rules in sublists at hash
 897 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
 898 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
 899 */
 900void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
 901{
 902	struct audit_names *n;
 903
 904	if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
 905		return;
 906
 907	rcu_read_lock();
 908
 909	list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 910		if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
 911			break;
 912	}
 913	rcu_read_unlock();
 914}
 915
 916static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
 917{
 918	kfree(context->proctitle.value);
 919	context->proctitle.value = NULL;
 920	context->proctitle.len = 0;
 921}
 922
 923static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
 924{
 925	if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
 926		kfree(context->module.name);
 927		context->module.name = NULL;
 928	}
 929}
 930static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 931{
 932	struct audit_names *n, *next;
 933
 934	list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
 935		list_del(&n->list);
 936		if (n->name)
 937			putname(n->name);
 938		if (n->should_free)
 939			kfree(n);
 940	}
 941	context->name_count = 0;
 942	path_put(&context->pwd);
 943	context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
 944	context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
 945}
 946
 947static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 948{
 949	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 950
 951	while ((aux = context->aux)) {
 952		context->aux = aux->next;
 953		kfree(aux);
 954	}
 955	context->aux = NULL;
 956	while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
 957		context->aux_pids = aux->next;
 958		kfree(aux);
 959	}
 960	context->aux_pids = NULL;
 961}
 962
 963/**
 964 * audit_reset_context - reset a audit_context structure
 965 * @ctx: the audit_context to reset
 966 *
 967 * All fields in the audit_context will be reset to an initial state, all
 968 * references held by fields will be dropped, and private memory will be
 969 * released.  When this function returns the audit_context will be suitable
 970 * for reuse, so long as the passed context is not NULL or a dummy context.
 971 */
 972static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
 973{
 974	if (!ctx)
 975		return;
 976
 977	/* if ctx is non-null, reset the "ctx->context" regardless */
 978	ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
 979	if (ctx->dummy)
 980		return;
 981
 982	/*
 983	 * NOTE: It shouldn't matter in what order we release the fields, so
 984	 *       release them in the order in which they appear in the struct;
 985	 *       this gives us some hope of quickly making sure we are
 986	 *       resetting the audit_context properly.
 987	 *
 988	 *       Other things worth mentioning:
 989	 *       - we don't reset "dummy"
 990	 *       - we don't reset "state", we do reset "current_state"
 991	 *       - we preserve "filterkey" if "state" is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
 992	 *       - much of this is likely overkill, but play it safe for now
 993	 *       - we really need to work on improving the audit_context struct
 994	 */
 995
 996	ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
 997	ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
 998	ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
 999	ctx->major = 0;
1000	ctx->uring_op = 0;
1001	memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1002	ctx->return_code = 0;
1003	ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
1004	ctx->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1005	audit_free_names(ctx);
1006	if (ctx->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
1007		kfree(ctx->filterkey);
1008		ctx->filterkey = NULL;
1009	}
1010	audit_free_aux(ctx);
1011	kfree(ctx->sockaddr);
1012	ctx->sockaddr = NULL;
1013	ctx->sockaddr_len = 0;
1014	ctx->ppid = 0;
1015	ctx->uid = ctx->euid = ctx->suid = ctx->fsuid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
1016	ctx->gid = ctx->egid = ctx->sgid = ctx->fsgid = KGIDT_INIT(0);
1017	ctx->personality = 0;
1018	ctx->arch = 0;
1019	ctx->target_pid = 0;
1020	ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
1021	ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
1022	lsmprop_init(&ctx->target_ref);
1023	ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
1024	unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
1025	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
1026	audit_free_module(ctx);
1027	ctx->fds[0] = -1;
1028	ctx->type = 0; /* reset last for audit_free_*() */
1029}
1030
1031static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
1032{
1033	struct audit_context *context;
1034
1035	context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
1036	if (!context)
1037		return NULL;
1038	context->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
1039	context->state = state;
1040	context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
1041	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
1042	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
1043	context->fds[0] = -1;
1044	context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1045	return context;
1046}
1047
1048/**
1049 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1050 * @tsk: task
1051 *
1052 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1053 * if necessary.  Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1054 * specified task.  This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1055 * needed.
1056 */
1057int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
1058{
1059	struct audit_context *context;
1060	enum audit_state     state;
1061	char *key = NULL;
1062
1063	if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
1064		return 0;
1065
1066	state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
1067	if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
1068		clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1069		return 0;
1070	}
1071
1072	context = audit_alloc_context(state);
1073	if (!context) {
1074		kfree(key);
1075		audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1076		return -ENOMEM;
1077	}
1078	context->filterkey = key;
1079
1080	audit_set_context(tsk, context);
1081	set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1082	return 0;
1083}
1084
1085static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1086{
1087	/* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */
1088	audit_reset_context(context);
1089	audit_proctitle_free(context);
1090	free_tree_refs(context);
1091	kfree(context->filterkey);
1092	kfree(context);
1093}
1094
1095static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1096				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
1097				 unsigned int sessionid, struct lsm_prop *prop,
1098				 char *comm)
1099{
1100	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1101	int rc = 0;
1102
1103	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1104	if (!ab)
1105		return rc;
1106
1107	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
1108			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
1109			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1110	if (lsmprop_is_set(prop) && audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, prop))
1111		rc = 1;
1112
1113	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1114	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1115	audit_log_end(ab);
1116
1117	return rc;
1118}
1119
1120static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1121				  struct audit_buffer **ab)
1122{
1123	long len_max;
1124	long len_rem;
1125	long len_full;
1126	long len_buf;
1127	long len_abuf = 0;
1128	long len_tmp;
1129	bool require_data;
1130	bool encode;
1131	unsigned int iter;
1132	unsigned int arg;
1133	char *buf_head;
1134	char *buf;
1135	const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1136
1137	/* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1138	 *       data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1139	 *       code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1140	char abuf[96];
1141
1142	/* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1143	 *       current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1144	 *       is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1145	 *       room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1146	WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1147	len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1148
1149	/* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1150	buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1151	if (!buf_head) {
1152		audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1153		return;
1154	}
1155	buf = buf_head;
1156
1157	audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1158
1159	len_rem = len_max;
1160	len_buf = 0;
1161	len_full = 0;
1162	require_data = true;
1163	encode = false;
1164	iter = 0;
1165	arg = 0;
1166	do {
1167		/* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1168		 *       serious, but the audit record format insists we
1169		 *       provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1170		 *       e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1171		 *       to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1172		 *       recording in the log, although we don't use it
1173		 *       anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1174		if (len_full == 0)
1175			len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1176
1177		/* read more data from userspace */
1178		if (require_data) {
1179			/* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1180			if (buf != buf_head) {
1181				memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1182				buf = buf_head;
1183			}
1184
1185			/* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1186			len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1187						    len_max - len_buf);
1188			if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1189				/* unable to copy from userspace */
1190				send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1191				goto out;
1192			} else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1193				/* buffer is not large enough */
1194				require_data = true;
1195				/* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1196				 *       buffers force the encoding so we stand
1197				 *       a chance at a sane len_full value and
1198				 *       consistent record encoding */
1199				encode = true;
1200				len_full = len_full * 2;
1201				p += len_tmp;
1202			} else {
1203				require_data = false;
1204				if (!encode)
1205					encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1206								buf, len_tmp);
1207				/* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1208				if (len_full < len_max)
1209					len_full = (encode ?
1210						    len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1211				p += len_tmp + 1;
1212			}
1213			len_buf += len_tmp;
1214			buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1215
1216			/* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1217			len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1218		}
1219
1220		/* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1221		if (len_buf >= 0) {
1222			/* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1223			 *       can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1224			 *       existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1225			 *       a new buffer */
1226			if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1227				len_rem = len_max;
1228				audit_log_end(*ab);
1229				*ab = audit_log_start(context,
1230						      GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1231				if (!*ab)
1232					goto out;
1233			}
1234
1235			/* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1236			len_tmp = 0;
1237			if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1238			    ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1239				if (iter == 0) {
1240					len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1241							sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1242							" a%d_len=%lu",
1243							arg, len_full);
1244				}
1245				len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1246						    sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1247						    " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1248			} else
1249				len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1250						    sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1251						    " a%d=", arg);
1252			WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1253			abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1254
1255			/* log the arg in the audit record */
1256			audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1257			len_rem -= len_tmp;
1258			len_tmp = len_buf;
1259			if (encode) {
1260				if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1261					len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1262				audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1263				len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1264				len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1265			} else {
1266				if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1267					len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1268				audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1269				len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1270				/* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1271				 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1272				len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1273			}
1274			len_buf -= len_tmp;
1275			buf += len_tmp;
1276		}
1277
1278		/* ready to move to the next argument? */
1279		if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1280			arg++;
1281			iter = 0;
1282			len_full = 0;
1283			require_data = true;
1284			encode = false;
1285		}
1286	} while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1287
1288	/* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1289
1290out:
1291	kfree(buf_head);
1292}
1293
1294static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1295			  kernel_cap_t *cap)
1296{
1297	if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1298		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1299		return;
1300	}
1301	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%016llx", prefix, cap->val);
1302}
1303
1304static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1305{
1306	if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1307		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1308		return;
1309	}
1310	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1311	audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1312	audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1313			 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1314			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1315}
1316
1317static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
1318{
1319	const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
1320	const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
1321	static const char * const ntp_name[] = {
1322		"offset",
1323		"freq",
1324		"status",
1325		"tai",
1326		"tick",
1327		"adjust",
1328	};
1329	int type;
1330
1331	if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
1332		for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
1333			if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
1334				if (!*ab) {
1335					*ab = audit_log_start(context,
1336							GFP_KERNEL,
1337							AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
1338					if (!*ab)
1339						return;
1340				}
1341				audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
1342						 ntp_name[type],
1343						 ntp->vals[type].oldval,
1344						 ntp->vals[type].newval);
1345				audit_log_end(*ab);
1346				*ab = NULL;
1347			}
1348		}
1349	}
1350	if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
1351		if (!*ab) {
1352			*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1353					      AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
1354			if (!*ab)
1355				return;
1356		}
1357		audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
1358				 (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
1359		audit_log_end(*ab);
1360		*ab = NULL;
1361	}
1362}
1363
1364static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1365{
1366	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1367	int i;
1368
1369	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1370	if (!ab)
1371		return;
1372
1373	switch (context->type) {
1374	case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1375		int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1376
1377		audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1378		for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1379			audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1380				context->socketcall.args[i]);
1381		break; }
1382	case AUDIT_IPC:
1383		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1384				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1385				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1386				 context->ipc.mode);
1387		if (lsmprop_is_set(&context->ipc.oprop)) {
1388			if (audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, &context->ipc.oprop))
1389				*call_panic = 1;
1390		}
1391		if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1392			audit_log_end(ab);
1393			ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1394					     AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1395			if (unlikely(!ab))
1396				return;
1397			audit_log_format(ab,
1398				"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1399				context->ipc.qbytes,
1400				context->ipc.perm_uid,
1401				context->ipc.perm_gid,
1402				context->ipc.perm_mode);
1403		}
1404		break;
1405	case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1406		audit_log_format(ab,
1407			"oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1408			"mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1409			context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1410			context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1411			context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1412			context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1413			context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1414		break;
1415	case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1416		audit_log_format(ab,
1417			"mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1418			"abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1419			context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1420			context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1421			context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1422			(long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1423			context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1424		break;
1425	case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1426		audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1427				context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1428				context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1429		break;
1430	case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1431		struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1432
1433		audit_log_format(ab,
1434			"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1435			"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1436			context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1437			attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1438			attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1439		break; }
1440	case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1441		audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1442		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1443		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1444		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1445		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1446		break;
1447	case AUDIT_MMAP:
1448		audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1449				 context->mmap.flags);
1450		break;
1451	case AUDIT_OPENAT2:
1452		audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0%llo mode=0%llo resolve=0x%llx",
1453				 context->openat2.flags,
1454				 context->openat2.mode,
1455				 context->openat2.resolve);
1456		break;
1457	case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1458		audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1459		break;
1460	case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1461		audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1462		if (context->module.name) {
1463			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1464		} else
1465			audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1466
1467		break;
1468	case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
1469	case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
1470		/* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
1471		audit_log_time(context, &ab);
1472		break;
1473	}
1474	audit_log_end(ab);
1475}
1476
1477static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1478{
1479	char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1480
1481	while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1482		end--;
1483
1484	/* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1485	len = end - proctitle + 1;
1486	len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1487	return len;
1488}
1489
1490/*
1491 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1492 * @context: audit_context for the task
1493 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1494 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1495 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1496 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1497 */
1498static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1499		    const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1500{
1501	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1502
1503	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1504	if (!ab)
1505		return;
1506
1507	audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1508
1509	if (path)
1510		audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1511	else if (n->name) {
1512		switch (n->name_len) {
1513		case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1514			/* log the full path */
1515			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1516			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1517			break;
1518		case 0:
1519			/* name was specified as a relative path and the
1520			 * directory component is the cwd
1521			 */
1522			if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt)
1523				audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1524			else
1525				audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1526			break;
1527		default:
1528			/* log the name's directory component */
1529			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1530			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1531						    n->name_len);
1532		}
1533	} else
1534		audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1535
1536	if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1537		audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1538				 n->ino,
1539				 MAJOR(n->dev),
1540				 MINOR(n->dev),
1541				 n->mode,
1542				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1543				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1544				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1545				 MINOR(n->rdev));
1546	if (lsmprop_is_set(&n->oprop) &&
1547	    audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, &n->oprop))
1548		*call_panic = 2;
1549
1550	/* log the audit_names record type */
1551	switch (n->type) {
1552	case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1553		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1554		break;
1555	case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1556		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1557		break;
1558	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1559		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1560		break;
1561	case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1562		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1563		break;
1564	default:
1565		audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1566		break;
1567	}
1568
1569	audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1570	audit_log_end(ab);
1571}
1572
1573static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1574{
1575	int res;
1576	char *buf;
1577	char *msg = "(null)";
1578	int len = strlen(msg);
1579	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1580	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1581
1582	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1583	if (!ab)
1584		return;	/* audit_panic or being filtered */
1585
1586	audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1587
1588	/* Not  cached */
1589	if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1590		buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1591		if (!buf)
1592			goto out;
1593		/* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1594		res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1595		if (res == 0) {
1596			kfree(buf);
1597			goto out;
1598		}
1599		res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1600		if (res == 0) {
1601			kfree(buf);
1602			goto out;
1603		}
1604		context->proctitle.value = buf;
1605		context->proctitle.len = res;
1606	}
1607	msg = context->proctitle.value;
1608	len = context->proctitle.len;
1609out:
1610	audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1611	audit_log_end(ab);
1612}
1613
1614/**
1615 * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record
1616 * @ctx: the audit context
1617 */
1618static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx)
1619{
1620	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1621	const struct cred *cred;
1622
1623	ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP);
1624	if (!ab)
1625		return;
1626	cred = current_cred();
1627	audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op);
1628	if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1629		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1630				 str_yes_no(ctx->return_valid ==
1631					    AUDITSC_SUCCESS),
1632				 ctx->return_code);
1633	audit_log_format(ab,
1634			 " items=%d"
1635			 " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u"
1636			 " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
1637			 ctx->name_count,
1638			 task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current),
1639			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
1640			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
1641			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
1642			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
1643			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
1644			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
1645			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
1646			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
1647	audit_log_task_context(ab);
1648	audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey);
1649	audit_log_end(ab);
1650}
1651
1652static void audit_log_exit(void)
1653{
1654	int i, call_panic = 0;
1655	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1656	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1657	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1658	struct audit_names *n;
1659
1660	context->personality = current->personality;
1661
1662	switch (context->context) {
1663	case AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL:
1664		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1665		if (!ab)
1666			return;
1667		audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1668				 context->arch, context->major);
1669		if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1670			audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1671		if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1672			audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1673					 str_yes_no(context->return_valid ==
1674						    AUDITSC_SUCCESS),
1675					 context->return_code);
1676		audit_log_format(ab,
1677				 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1678				 context->argv[0],
1679				 context->argv[1],
1680				 context->argv[2],
1681				 context->argv[3],
1682				 context->name_count);
1683		audit_log_task_info(ab);
1684		audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1685		audit_log_end(ab);
1686		break;
1687	case AUDIT_CTX_URING:
1688		audit_log_uring(context);
1689		break;
1690	default:
1691		BUG();
1692		break;
1693	}
1694
1695	for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1696
1697		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1698		if (!ab)
1699			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1700
1701		switch (aux->type) {
1702
1703		case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1704			struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1705
1706			audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1707			audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1708			audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1709			audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1710			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1711			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1712			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1713			audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1714			audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1715			audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1716			audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1717			audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1718			audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1719					 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1720						   axs->fcap.rootid));
1721			break; }
1722
1723		}
1724		audit_log_end(ab);
1725	}
1726
1727	if (context->type)
1728		show_special(context, &call_panic);
1729
1730	if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1731		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1732		if (ab) {
1733			audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1734					context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1735			audit_log_end(ab);
1736		}
1737	}
1738
1739	if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1740		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1741		if (ab) {
1742			audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1743			audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1744					context->sockaddr_len);
1745			audit_log_end(ab);
1746		}
1747	}
1748
1749	for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1750		struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1751
1752		for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1753			if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1754						  axs->target_auid[i],
1755						  axs->target_uid[i],
1756						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
1757						  &axs->target_ref[i],
1758						  axs->target_comm[i]))
1759				call_panic = 1;
1760	}
1761
1762	if (context->target_pid &&
1763	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1764				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1765				  context->target_sessionid,
1766				  &context->target_ref,
1767				  context->target_comm))
1768		call_panic = 1;
1769
1770	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1771		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1772		if (ab) {
1773			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1774			audit_log_end(ab);
1775		}
1776	}
1777
1778	i = 0;
1779	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1780		if (n->hidden)
1781			continue;
1782		audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1783	}
1784
1785	if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
1786		audit_log_proctitle();
1787
1788	/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1789	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1790	if (ab)
1791		audit_log_end(ab);
1792	if (call_panic)
1793		audit_panic("error in audit_log_exit()");
1794}
1795
1796/**
1797 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1798 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1799 *
1800 * Called from copy_process, do_exit, and the io_uring code
1801 */
1802void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1803{
1804	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1805
1806	if (!context)
1807		return;
1808
1809	/* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
1810	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1811		audit_kill_trees(context);
1812
1813	/* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1814	 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1815	 * random task_struct that doesn't have any meaningful data we
1816	 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1817	 */
1818	if (tsk == current && !context->dummy) {
1819		context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1820		context->return_code = 0;
1821		if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
1822			audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
1823			audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1824			if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1825				audit_log_exit();
1826		} else if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_URING) {
1827			/* TODO: verify this case is real and valid */
1828			audit_filter_uring(tsk, context);
1829			audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1830			if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1831				audit_log_uring(context);
1832		}
1833	}
1834
1835	audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1836	audit_free_context(context);
1837}
1838
1839/**
1840 * audit_return_fixup - fixup the return codes in the audit_context
1841 * @ctx: the audit_context
1842 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
1843 * @code: operation return code
1844 *
1845 * We need to fixup the return code in the audit logs if the actual return
1846 * codes are later going to be fixed by the arch specific signal handlers.
1847 */
1848static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx,
1849			       int success, long code)
1850{
1851	/*
1852	 * This is actually a test for:
1853	 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1854	 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1855	 *
1856	 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1857	 */
1858	if (unlikely(code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1859	    (code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1860	    (code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1861		ctx->return_code = -EINTR;
1862	else
1863		ctx->return_code  = code;
1864	ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE);
1865}
1866
1867/**
1868 * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring
1869 * @op: the io_uring opcode
1870 *
1871 * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring
1872 * operations.  This function should only ever be called from
1873 * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
1874 * function.
1875 */
1876void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
1877{
1878	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
1879
1880	if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
1881		return;
1882
1883	/*
1884	 * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context
1885	 *       before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit()
1886	 *       is called.  In this case there is not much to do, just record
1887	 *       the io_uring details and return.
1888	 */
1889	ctx->uring_op = op;
1890	if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
1891		return;
1892
1893	ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1894	if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD)
1895		ctx->prio = 0;
1896
1897	ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
1898	ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
1899	ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
1900}
1901
1902/**
1903 * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring
1904 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
1905 * @code: operation return code
1906 *
1907 * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring
1908 * operations.  This function should only ever be called from
1909 * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
1910 * function.
1911 */
1912void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
1913{
1914	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
1915
1916	if (ctx->dummy) {
1917		if (ctx->context != AUDIT_CTX_URING)
1918			return;
1919		goto out;
1920	}
1921
1922	audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code);
1923	if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
1924		/*
1925		 * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case
1926		 *       where we may be called from process context before we
1927		 *       return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit().  In this
1928		 *       case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the
1929		 *       normal syscall exit handling will take care of
1930		 *       everything else.
1931		 *       It is also worth mentioning that when we are called,
1932		 *       the current process creds may differ from the creds
1933		 *       used during the normal syscall processing; keep that
1934		 *       in mind if/when we move the record generation code.
1935		 */
1936
1937		/*
1938		 * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we
1939		 * should emit a URINGOP record.  I know it seems odd but this
1940		 * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all*
1941		 * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve
1942		 * the behavior here.
1943		 */
1944		audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx);
1945		if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1946			audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
1947		audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
1948		if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1949			return;
1950
1951		audit_log_uring(ctx);
1952		return;
1953	}
1954
1955	/* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
1956	if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees))
1957		audit_kill_trees(ctx);
1958
1959	/* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
1960	audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
1961	audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
1962	if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1963		goto out;
1964	audit_log_exit();
1965
1966out:
1967	audit_reset_context(ctx);
1968}
1969
1970/**
1971 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1972 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1973 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1974 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1975 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1976 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1977 *
1978 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
1979 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1980 * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
1981 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
1982 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1983 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1984 * be written).
1985 */
1986void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1987			   unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1988{
1989	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1990	enum audit_state     state;
1991
1992	if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1993		return;
1994
1995	WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED);
1996	WARN_ON(context->name_count);
1997	if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) {
1998		audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()");
1999		return;
2000	}
2001
2002	state = context->state;
2003	if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
2004		return;
2005
2006	context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
2007	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
2008		context->prio = 0;
2009		if (auditd_test_task(current))
2010			return;
2011	}
2012
2013	context->arch	    = syscall_get_arch(current);
2014	context->major      = major;
2015	context->argv[0]    = a1;
2016	context->argv[1]    = a2;
2017	context->argv[2]    = a3;
2018	context->argv[3]    = a4;
2019	context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
2020	context->current_state  = state;
2021	ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
2022}
2023
2024/**
2025 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
2026 * @success: success value of the syscall
2027 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
2028 *
2029 * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
2030 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
2031 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
2032 * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
2033 * free the names stored from getname().
2034 */
2035void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
2036{
2037	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2038
2039	if (!context || context->dummy ||
2040	    context->context != AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
2041		goto out;
2042
2043	/* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
2044	if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
2045		audit_kill_trees(context);
2046
2047	audit_return_fixup(context, success, return_code);
2048	/* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
2049	audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
2050	audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
2051	if (context->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
2052		goto out;
2053
2054	audit_log_exit();
2055
2056out:
2057	audit_reset_context(context);
2058}
2059
2060static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
2061{
2062	struct audit_context *context;
2063	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
2064	struct audit_chunk *chunk;
2065	int count;
2066
2067	if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
2068		return;
2069	context = audit_context();
2070	p = context->trees;
2071	count = context->tree_count;
2072	rcu_read_lock();
2073	chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
2074	rcu_read_unlock();
2075	if (!chunk)
2076		return;
2077	if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
2078		return;
2079	if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
2080		pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
2081		audit_set_auditable(context);
2082		audit_put_chunk(chunk);
2083		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2084		return;
2085	}
2086	put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
2087}
2088
2089static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
2090{
2091	struct audit_context *context;
2092	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
2093	const struct dentry *d, *parent;
2094	struct audit_chunk *drop;
2095	unsigned long seq;
2096	int count;
2097
2098	context = audit_context();
2099	p = context->trees;
2100	count = context->tree_count;
2101retry:
2102	drop = NULL;
2103	d = dentry;
2104	rcu_read_lock();
2105	seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
2106	for (;;) {
2107		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
2108
2109		if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
2110			struct audit_chunk *chunk;
2111
2112			chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
2113			if (chunk) {
2114				if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
2115					drop = chunk;
2116					break;
2117				}
2118			}
2119		}
2120		parent = d->d_parent;
2121		if (parent == d)
2122			break;
2123		d = parent;
2124	}
2125	if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) {  /* in this order */
2126		rcu_read_unlock();
2127		if (!drop) {
2128			/* just a race with rename */
2129			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2130			goto retry;
2131		}
2132		audit_put_chunk(drop);
2133		if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
2134			/* OK, got more space */
2135			unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2136			goto retry;
2137		}
2138		/* too bad */
2139		pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
2140		unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2141		audit_set_auditable(context);
2142		return;
2143	}
2144	rcu_read_unlock();
2145}
2146
2147static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
2148						unsigned char type)
2149{
2150	struct audit_names *aname;
2151
2152	if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
2153		aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
2154		memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
2155	} else {
2156		aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
2157		if (!aname)
2158			return NULL;
2159		aname->should_free = true;
2160	}
2161
2162	aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2163	aname->type = type;
2164	list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
2165
2166	context->name_count++;
2167	if (!context->pwd.dentry)
2168		get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
2169	return aname;
2170}
2171
2172/**
2173 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
2174 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
2175 *
2176 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
2177 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
2178 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
2179 */
2180struct filename *
2181__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
2182{
2183	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2184	struct audit_names *n;
2185
2186	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2187		if (!n->name)
2188			continue;
2189		if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
2190			return refname(n->name);
2191	}
2192	return NULL;
2193}
2194
2195/**
2196 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
2197 * @name: name to add
2198 *
2199 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2200 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2201 */
2202void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
2203{
2204	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2205	struct audit_names *n;
2206
2207	if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2208		return;
2209
2210	n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2211	if (!n)
2212		return;
2213
2214	n->name = name;
2215	n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2216	name->aname = n;
2217	refname(name);
2218}
2219
2220static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
2221				   const struct dentry *dentry)
2222{
2223	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2224	int rc;
2225
2226	if (!dentry)
2227		return 0;
2228
2229	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &caps);
2230	if (rc)
2231		return rc;
2232
2233	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2234	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2235	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2236	name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
2237	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
2238				VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2239
2240	return 0;
2241}
2242
2243/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2244static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
2245			     const struct dentry *dentry,
2246			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
2247{
2248	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
2249	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2250	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
2251	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
2252	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
2253	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
2254	security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &name->oprop);
2255	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
2256		name->fcap_ver = -1;
2257		return;
2258	}
2259	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2260}
2261
2262/**
2263 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2264 * @name: name being audited
2265 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2266 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
2267 */
2268void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2269		   unsigned int flags)
2270{
2271	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2272	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2273	struct audit_names *n;
2274	bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
2275	struct audit_entry *e;
2276	struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2277	int i;
2278
2279	if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2280		return;
2281
2282	rcu_read_lock();
2283	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2284		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2285			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2286
2287			if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2288			    && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2289						f->op, f->val)
2290			    && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2291				rcu_read_unlock();
2292				return;
2293			}
2294		}
2295	}
2296	rcu_read_unlock();
2297
2298	if (!name)
2299		goto out_alloc;
2300
2301	/*
2302	 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2303	 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2304	 */
2305	n = name->aname;
2306	if (n) {
2307		if (parent) {
2308			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2309			    n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2310				goto out;
2311		} else {
2312			if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2313				goto out;
2314		}
2315	}
2316
2317	list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2318		if (n->ino) {
2319			/* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2320			if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2321			    n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2322				continue;
2323		} else if (n->name) {
2324			/* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2325			if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2326				continue;
2327		} else
2328			/* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2329			continue;
2330
2331		/* match the correct record type */
2332		if (parent) {
2333			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2334			    n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2335				goto out;
2336		} else {
2337			if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2338				goto out;
2339		}
2340	}
2341
2342out_alloc:
2343	/* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2344	n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2345	if (!n)
2346		return;
2347	if (name) {
2348		n->name = name;
2349		refname(name);
2350	}
2351
2352out:
2353	if (parent) {
2354		n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2355		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2356		if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2357			n->hidden = true;
2358	} else {
2359		n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2360		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2361	}
2362	handle_path(dentry);
2363	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2364}
2365
2366void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2367{
2368	__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2369}
2370
2371/**
2372 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2373 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2374 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2375 * @type:   AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2376 *
2377 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2378 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2379 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2380 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2381 * the object is created.  Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2382 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2383 * unsuccessful attempts.
2384 */
2385void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2386			 const struct dentry *dentry,
2387			 const unsigned char type)
2388{
2389	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2390	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2391	const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2392	struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2393	struct audit_entry *e;
2394	struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2395	int i;
2396
2397	if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2398		return;
2399
2400	rcu_read_lock();
2401	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2402		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2403			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2404
2405			if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2406			    && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2407						f->op, f->val)
2408			    && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2409				rcu_read_unlock();
2410				return;
2411			}
2412		}
2413	}
2414	rcu_read_unlock();
2415
2416	if (inode)
2417		handle_one(inode);
2418
2419	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2420		/* can only match entries that have a name */
2421		if (!n->name)
2422			continue;
2423
2424		/* look for a parent entry first */
2425		if (!found_parent &&
2426		    (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) &&
2427		    (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2428		     !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len))) {
2429			n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2430			found_parent = n;
2431			if (found_child)
2432				break;
2433			continue;
2434		}
2435
2436		/* is there a matching child entry? */
2437		if (!found_child &&
2438		    (n->type == type || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) &&
2439		    (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2440		     !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2441						found_parent ?
2442						found_parent->name_len :
2443						AUDIT_NAME_FULL))) {
2444			if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2445				n->type = type;
2446			found_child = n;
2447			if (found_parent)
2448				break;
2449		}
2450	}
2451
2452	if (!found_parent) {
2453		/* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2454		n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2455		if (!n)
2456			return;
2457		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2458	}
2459
2460	if (!found_child) {
2461		found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2462		if (!found_child)
2463			return;
2464
2465		/* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2466		 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2467		 * audit_free_names() */
2468		if (found_parent) {
2469			found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2470			found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2471			refname(found_child->name);
2472		}
2473	}
2474
2475	if (inode)
2476		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2477	else
2478		found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2479}
2480EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2481
2482/**
2483 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2484 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2485 * @stamp: timestamp to record
2486 *
2487 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2488 */
2489int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
2490{
2491	if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2492		return 0;
2493	if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
2494		ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
2495	*stamp = ctx->stamp;
2496	if (!ctx->prio) {
2497		ctx->prio = 1;
2498		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
2499	}
2500	return 1;
2501}
2502
2503/**
2504 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2505 * @oflag: open flag
2506 * @mode: mode bits
2507 * @attr: queue attributes
2508 *
2509 */
2510void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2511{
2512	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2513
2514	if (attr)
2515		memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2516	else
2517		memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2518
2519	context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2520	context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2521
2522	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2523}
2524
2525/**
2526 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2527 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2528 * @msg_len: Message length
2529 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2530 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2531 *
2532 */
2533void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2534			const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2535{
2536	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2537	struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2538
2539	if (abs_timeout)
2540		memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2541	else
2542		memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2543
2544	context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2545	context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2546	context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2547
2548	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2549}
2550
2551/**
2552 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2553 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2554 * @notification: Notification event
2555 *
2556 */
2557
2558void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2559{
2560	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2561
2562	if (notification)
2563		context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2564	else
2565		context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2566
2567	context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2568	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2569}
2570
2571/**
2572 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2573 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2574 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2575 *
2576 */
2577void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2578{
2579	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2580
2581	context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2582	context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2583	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2584}
2585
2586/**
2587 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2588 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2589 *
2590 */
2591void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2592{
2593	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2594
2595	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2596	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2597	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2598	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2599	security_ipc_getlsmprop(ipcp, &context->ipc.oprop);
2600	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2601}
2602
2603/**
2604 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2605 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2606 * @uid: msgq user id
2607 * @gid: msgq group id
2608 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2609 *
2610 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2611 */
2612void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2613{
2614	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2615
2616	context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2617	context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2618	context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2619	context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2620	context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2621}
2622
2623void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2624{
2625	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2626
2627	context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2628	context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2629}
2630
2631
2632/**
2633 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2634 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2635 * @args: args array
2636 *
2637 */
2638int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2639{
2640	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2641
2642	if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2643		return -EINVAL;
2644	context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2645	context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2646	memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2647	return 0;
2648}
2649
2650/**
2651 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2652 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2653 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2654 *
2655 */
2656void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2657{
2658	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2659
2660	context->fds[0] = fd1;
2661	context->fds[1] = fd2;
2662}
2663
2664/**
2665 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2666 * @len: data length in user space
2667 * @a: data address in kernel space
2668 *
2669 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2670 */
2671int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2672{
2673	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2674
2675	if (!context->sockaddr) {
2676		void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2677
2678		if (!p)
2679			return -ENOMEM;
2680		context->sockaddr = p;
2681	}
2682
2683	context->sockaddr_len = len;
2684	memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2685	return 0;
2686}
2687
2688void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2689{
2690	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2691
2692	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2693	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2694	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2695	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2696	strscpy(context->target_comm, t->comm);
2697	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &context->target_ref);
2698}
2699
2700/**
2701 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2702 * @t: task being signaled
2703 *
2704 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2705 * and uid that is doing that.
2706 */
2707int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2708{
2709	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2710	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2711	kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2712
2713	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2714		return 0;
2715
2716	/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2717	 * in audit_context */
2718	if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2719		ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2720		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2721		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2722		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2723		strscpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm);
2724		security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &ctx->target_ref);
2725		return 0;
2726	}
2727
2728	axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2729	if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2730		axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2731		if (!axp)
2732			return -ENOMEM;
2733
2734		axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2735		axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2736		ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2737	}
2738	BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2739
2740	axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2741	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2742	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2743	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2744	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &axp->target_ref[axp->pid_count]);
2745	strscpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm);
2746	axp->pid_count++;
2747
2748	return 0;
2749}
2750
2751/**
2752 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2753 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2754 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2755 * @old: the old credentials
2756 *
2757 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2758 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2759 *
2760 * -Eric
2761 */
2762int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2763			   const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2764{
2765	struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2766	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2767	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2768
2769	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2770	if (!ax)
2771		return -ENOMEM;
2772
2773	ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2774	ax->d.next = context->aux;
2775	context->aux = (void *)ax;
2776
2777	get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&nop_mnt_idmap,
2778			       bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2779
2780	ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2781	ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2782	ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2783	ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2784	ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2785
2786	ax->old_pcap.permitted   = old->cap_permitted;
2787	ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2788	ax->old_pcap.effective   = old->cap_effective;
2789	ax->old_pcap.ambient     = old->cap_ambient;
2790
2791	ax->new_pcap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
2792	ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2793	ax->new_pcap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
2794	ax->new_pcap.ambient     = new->cap_ambient;
2795	return 0;
2796}
2797
2798/**
2799 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2800 * @new: the new credentials
2801 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2802 *
2803 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2804 * audit system if applicable
2805 */
2806void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2807{
2808	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2809
2810	context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2811	context->capset.cap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
2812	context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2813	context->capset.cap.permitted   = new->cap_permitted;
2814	context->capset.cap.ambient     = new->cap_ambient;
2815	context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2816}
2817
2818void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2819{
2820	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2821
2822	context->mmap.fd = fd;
2823	context->mmap.flags = flags;
2824	context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2825}
2826
2827void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how)
2828{
2829	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2830
2831	context->openat2.flags = how->flags;
2832	context->openat2.mode = how->mode;
2833	context->openat2.resolve = how->resolve;
2834	context->type = AUDIT_OPENAT2;
2835}
2836
2837void __audit_log_kern_module(const char *name)
2838{
2839	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2840
2841	context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2842	if (!context->module.name)
2843		audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2844	context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2845}
2846
2847void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
2848{
2849	/* {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}: no,yes,unknown */
2850	switch (friar->hdr.type) {
2851	case FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_NONE:
2852		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY,
2853			  "resp=%u fan_type=%u fan_info=0 subj_trust=2 obj_trust=2",
2854			  response, FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_NONE);
2855		break;
2856	case FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_AUDIT_RULE:
2857		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY,
2858			  "resp=%u fan_type=%u fan_info=%X subj_trust=%u obj_trust=%u",
2859			  response, friar->hdr.type, friar->rule_number,
2860			  friar->subj_trust, friar->obj_trust);
2861	}
2862}
2863
2864void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2865{
2866	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2867
2868	/* only set type if not already set by NTP */
2869	if (!context->type)
2870		context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
2871	memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
2872}
2873
2874void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2875{
2876	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2877	int type;
2878
2879	for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
2880		if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
2881			/* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
2882			context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
2883			memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
2884			break;
2885		}
2886}
2887
2888void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
2889		       enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
2890{
2891	struct audit_buffer *ab;
2892	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2893
2894	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
2895	if (!ab)
2896		return;
2897	audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2898			 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
2899
2900	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current));
2901	audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
2902	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
2903	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2904	audit_log_end(ab);
2905}
2906EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
2907
2908static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2909{
2910	kuid_t auid, uid;
2911	kgid_t gid;
2912	unsigned int sessionid;
2913	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2914
2915	auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2916	sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2917	current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2918
2919	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2920			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2921			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2922			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2923			 sessionid);
2924	audit_log_task_context(ab);
2925	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2926	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2927	audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2928}
2929
2930/**
2931 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2932 * @signr: signal value
2933 *
2934 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2935 * should record the event for investigation.
2936 */
2937void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2938{
2939	struct audit_buffer *ab;
2940
2941	if (!audit_enabled)
2942		return;
2943
2944	if (signr == SIGQUIT)	/* don't care for those */
2945		return;
2946
2947	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2948	if (unlikely(!ab))
2949		return;
2950	audit_log_task(ab);
2951	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2952	audit_log_end(ab);
2953}
2954
2955/**
2956 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2957 * @syscall: syscall number
2958 * @signr: signal value
2959 * @code: the seccomp action
2960 *
2961 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2962 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2963 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2964 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2965 * audit is not in use.
2966 */
2967void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2968{
2969	struct audit_buffer *ab;
2970
2971	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2972	if (unlikely(!ab))
2973		return;
2974	audit_log_task(ab);
2975	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2976			 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2977			 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2978	audit_log_end(ab);
2979}
2980
2981void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2982				  int res)
2983{
2984	struct audit_buffer *ab;
2985
2986	if (!audit_enabled)
2987		return;
2988
2989	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2990			     AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2991	if (unlikely(!ab))
2992		return;
2993
2994	audit_log_format(ab,
2995			 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2996			 names, old_names, res);
2997	audit_log_end(ab);
2998}
2999
3000struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
3001{
3002	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
3003	if (likely(!ctx || ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED))
3004		return NULL;
3005	return &ctx->killed_trees;
3006}