pti.c

  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  2/*
  3 * Copyright(c) 2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
  4 *
  5 * This code is based in part on work published here:
  6 *
  7 *	https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
  8 *
  9 * The original work was written by and signed off by for the Linux
 10 * kernel by:
 11 *
 12 *   Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
 13 *   Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
 14 *   Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
 15 *   Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
 16 *
 17 * Major changes to the original code by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
 18 * Mostly rewritten by Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> and
 19 *		       Andy Lutomirsky <luto@amacapital.net>
 20 */
 21#include <linux/kernel.h>
 22#include <linux/errno.h>
 23#include <linux/string.h>
 24#include <linux/types.h>
 25#include <linux/bug.h>
 26#include <linux/init.h>
 27#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 28#include <linux/mm.h>
 29#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 30#include <linux/cpu.h>
 31
 32#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 33#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
 34#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
 35#include <asm/cmdline.h>
 36#include <asm/pti.h>
 37#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 38#include <asm/desc.h>
 39#include <asm/sections.h>
 40#include <asm/set_memory.h>
 41#include <asm/bugs.h>
 42
 43#undef pr_fmt
 44#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
 45
 46/* Backporting helper */
 47#ifndef __GFP_NOTRACK
 48#define __GFP_NOTRACK	0
 49#endif
 50
 51/*
 52 * Define the page-table levels we clone for user-space on 32
 53 * and 64 bit.
 54 */
 55#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 56#define	PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE	PTI_CLONE_PMD
 57#else
 58#define	PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE	PTI_CLONE_PTE
 59#endif
 60
 61static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
 62{
 63	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
 64		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
 65}
 66
 67static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
 68{
 69	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
 70		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
 71}
 72
 73/* Assume mode is auto unless overridden via cmdline below. */
 74static enum pti_mode {
 75	PTI_AUTO = 0,
 76	PTI_FORCE_OFF,
 77	PTI_FORCE_ON
 78} pti_mode;
 79
 80void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 81{
 82	if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV)) {
 83		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 84		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on XEN PV.");
 85		return;
 86	}
 87
 88	if (pti_mode == PTI_AUTO &&
 89	    !cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL))
 90		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 91	if (pti_mode == PTI_FORCE_OFF) {
 92		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 93		return;
 94	}
 95
 96	if (pti_mode == PTI_FORCE_ON)
 97		pti_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
 98
 99	if (pti_mode == PTI_AUTO && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
100		return;
101
102	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
103
104	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB)) {
105		pr_debug("PTI enabled, disabling INVLPGB\n");
106		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB);
107	}
108}
109
110static int __init pti_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
111{
112	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
113		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
114	else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
115		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_ON;
116	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
117		pti_mode = PTI_AUTO;
118	else
119		return -EINVAL;
120	return 0;
121}
122early_param("pti", pti_parse_cmdline);
123
124static int __init pti_parse_cmdline_nopti(char *arg)
125{
126	pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
127	return 0;
128}
129early_param("nopti", pti_parse_cmdline_nopti);
130
131pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
132{
133	/*
134	 * Changes to the high (kernel) portion of the kernelmode page
135	 * tables are not automatically propagated to the usermode tables.
136	 *
137	 * Users should keep in mind that, unlike the kernelmode tables,
138	 * there is no vmalloc_fault equivalent for the usermode tables.
139	 * Top-level entries added to init_mm's usermode pgd after boot
140	 * will not be automatically propagated to other mms.
141	 */
142	if (!pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp) || (pgd.pgd & _PAGE_NOPTISHADOW))
143		return pgd;
144
145	/*
146	 * The user page tables get the full PGD, accessible from
147	 * userspace:
148	 */
149	kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
150
151	/*
152	 * If this is normal user memory, make it NX in the kernel
153	 * pagetables so that, if we somehow screw up and return to
154	 * usermode with the kernel CR3 loaded, we'll get a page fault
155	 * instead of allowing user code to execute with the wrong CR3.
156	 *
157	 * As exceptions, we don't set NX if:
158	 *  - _PAGE_USER is not set.  This could be an executable
159	 *     EFI runtime mapping or something similar, and the kernel
160	 *     may execute from it
161	 *  - we don't have NX support
162	 *  - we're clearing the PGD (i.e. the new pgd is not present).
163	 */
164	if ((pgd.pgd & (_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_PRESENT)) == (_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_PRESENT) &&
165	    (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
166		pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
167
168	/* return the copy of the PGD we want the kernel to use: */
169	return pgd;
170}
171
172/*
173 * Walk the user copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
174 * page table pages on the way down.
175 *
176 * Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure.
177 */
178static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
179{
180	pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address));
181	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
182
183	if (address < PAGE_OFFSET) {
184		WARN_ONCE(1, "attempt to walk user address\n");
185		return NULL;
186	}
187
188	if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
189		unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
190		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_p4d_page))
191			return NULL;
192
193		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
194	}
195	BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_leaf(*pgd));
196
197	return p4d_offset(pgd, address);
198}
199
200/*
201 * Walk the user copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
202 * page table pages on the way down.
203 *
204 * Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure.
205 */
206static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
207{
208	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
209	p4d_t *p4d;
210	pud_t *pud;
211
212	p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address);
213	if (!p4d)
214		return NULL;
215
216	BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_leaf(*p4d));
217	if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
218		unsigned long new_pud_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
219		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pud_page))
220			return NULL;
221
222		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
223	}
224
225	pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
226	/* The user page tables do not use large mappings: */
227	if (pud_leaf(*pud)) {
228		WARN_ON(1);
229		return NULL;
230	}
231	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
232		unsigned long new_pmd_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
233		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pmd_page))
234			return NULL;
235
236		set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
237	}
238
239	return pmd_offset(pud, address);
240}
241
242/*
243 * Walk the shadow copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate
244 * page table pages on the way down.  Does not support large pages.
245 *
246 * Note: this is only used when mapping *new* kernel data into the
247 * user/shadow page tables.  It is never used for userspace data.
248 *
249 * Returns a pointer to a PTE on success, or NULL on failure.
250 */
251static pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address, bool late_text)
252{
253	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
254	pmd_t *pmd;
255	pte_t *pte;
256
257	pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(address);
258	if (!pmd)
259		return NULL;
260
261	/* Large PMD mapping found */
262	if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) {
263		/* Clear the PMD if we hit a large mapping from the first round */
264		if (late_text) {
265			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(0));
266		} else {
267			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
268			return NULL;
269		}
270	}
271
272	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
273		unsigned long new_pte_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
274		if (!new_pte_page)
275			return NULL;
276
277		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
278	}
279
280	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
281	if (pte_flags(*pte) & _PAGE_USER) {
282		WARN_ONCE(1, "attempt to walk to user pte\n");
283		return NULL;
284	}
285	return pte;
286}
287
288#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
289static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void)
290{
291	pte_t *pte, *target_pte;
292	unsigned int level;
293
294	pte = lookup_address(VSYSCALL_ADDR, &level);
295	if (!pte || WARN_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K) || pte_none(*pte))
296		return;
297
298	target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(VSYSCALL_ADDR, false);
299	if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
300		return;
301
302	*target_pte = *pte;
303	set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(kernel_to_user_pgdp(swapper_pg_dir));
304}
305#else
306static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void) { }
307#endif
308
309enum pti_clone_level {
310	PTI_CLONE_PMD,
311	PTI_CLONE_PTE,
312};
313
314static void
315pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
316		  enum pti_clone_level level, bool late_text)
317{
318	unsigned long addr;
319
320	/*
321	 * Clone the populated PMDs which cover start to end. These PMD areas
322	 * can have holes.
323	 */
324	for (addr = start; addr < end;) {
325		pte_t *pte, *target_pte;
326		pmd_t *pmd, *target_pmd;
327		pgd_t *pgd;
328		p4d_t *p4d;
329		pud_t *pud;
330
331		/* Overflow check */
332		if (addr < start)
333			break;
334
335		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
336		if (WARN_ON(pgd_none(*pgd)))
337			return;
338		p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
339		if (WARN_ON(p4d_none(*p4d)))
340			return;
341
342		pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
343		if (pud_none(*pud)) {
344			WARN_ON_ONCE(addr & ~PUD_MASK);
345			addr = round_up(addr + 1, PUD_SIZE);
346			continue;
347		}
348
349		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
350		if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
351			WARN_ON_ONCE(addr & ~PMD_MASK);
352			addr = round_up(addr + 1, PMD_SIZE);
353			continue;
354		}
355
356		if (pmd_leaf(*pmd) || level == PTI_CLONE_PMD) {
357			target_pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(addr);
358			if (WARN_ON(!target_pmd))
359				return;
360
361			/*
362			 * Only clone present PMDs.  This ensures only setting
363			 * _PAGE_GLOBAL on present PMDs.  This should only be
364			 * called on well-known addresses anyway, so a non-
365			 * present PMD would be a surprise.
366			 */
367			if (WARN_ON(!(pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT)))
368				return;
369
370			/*
371			 * Setting 'target_pmd' below creates a mapping in both
372			 * the user and kernel page tables.  It is effectively
373			 * global, so set it as global in both copies.  Note:
374			 * the X86_FEATURE_PGE check is not _required_ because
375			 * the CPU ignores _PAGE_GLOBAL when PGE is not
376			 * supported.  The check keeps consistency with
377			 * code that only set this bit when supported.
378			 */
379			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE))
380				*pmd = pmd_set_flags(*pmd, _PAGE_GLOBAL);
381
382			/*
383			 * Copy the PMD.  That is, the kernelmode and usermode
384			 * tables will share the last-level page tables of this
385			 * address range
386			 */
387			*target_pmd = *pmd;
388
389			addr = round_up(addr + 1, PMD_SIZE);
390
391		} else if (level == PTI_CLONE_PTE) {
392
393			/* Walk the page-table down to the pte level */
394			pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
395			if (pte_none(*pte)) {
396				addr = round_up(addr + 1, PAGE_SIZE);
397				continue;
398			}
399
400			/* Only clone present PTEs */
401			if (WARN_ON(!(pte_flags(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT)))
402				return;
403
404			/* Allocate PTE in the user page-table */
405			target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(addr, late_text);
406			if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
407				return;
408
409			/* Set GLOBAL bit in both PTEs */
410			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE))
411				*pte = pte_set_flags(*pte, _PAGE_GLOBAL);
412
413			/* Clone the PTE */
414			*target_pte = *pte;
415
416			addr = round_up(addr + 1, PAGE_SIZE);
417
418		} else {
419			BUG();
420		}
421	}
422}
423
424#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
425/*
426 * Clone a single p4d (i.e. a top-level entry on 4-level systems and a
427 * next-level entry on 5-level systems.
428 */
429static void __init pti_clone_p4d(unsigned long addr)
430{
431	p4d_t *kernel_p4d, *user_p4d;
432	pgd_t *kernel_pgd;
433
434	user_p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(addr);
435	if (!user_p4d)
436		return;
437
438	kernel_pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
439	kernel_p4d = p4d_offset(kernel_pgd, addr);
440	*user_p4d = *kernel_p4d;
441}
442
443/*
444 * Clone the CPU_ENTRY_AREA and associated data into the user space visible
445 * page table.
446 */
447static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void)
448{
449	unsigned int cpu;
450
451	pti_clone_p4d(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE);
452
453	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
454		/*
455		 * The SYSCALL64 entry code needs one word of scratch space
456		 * in which to spill a register.  It lives in the sp2 slot
457		 * of the CPU's TSS.
458		 *
459		 * This is done for all possible CPUs during boot to ensure
460		 * that it's propagated to all mms.
461		 */
462
463		unsigned long va = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
464		phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys((void *)va);
465		pte_t *target_pte;
466
467		target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(va, false);
468		if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
469			return;
470
471		*target_pte = pfn_pte(pa >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL);
472	}
473}
474
475#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
476
477/*
478 * On 32 bit PAE systems with 1GB of Kernel address space there is only
479 * one pgd/p4d for the whole kernel. Cloning that would map the whole
480 * address space into the user page-tables, making PTI useless. So clone
481 * the page-table on the PMD level to prevent that.
482 */
483static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void)
484{
485	unsigned long start, end;
486
487	start = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE;
488	end   = start + (PAGE_SIZE * CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES);
489
490	pti_clone_pgtable(start, end, PTI_CLONE_PMD, false);
491}
492#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
493
494/*
495 * Clone the ESPFIX P4D into the user space visible page table
496 */
497static void __init pti_setup_espfix64(void)
498{
499#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
500	pti_clone_p4d(ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR);
501#endif
502}
503
504/*
505 * Clone the populated PMDs of the entry text and force it RO.
506 */
507static void pti_clone_entry_text(bool late)
508{
509	pti_clone_pgtable((unsigned long) __entry_text_start,
510			  (unsigned long) __entry_text_end,
511			  PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE, late);
512}
513
514/*
515 * Global pages and PCIDs are both ways to make kernel TLB entries
516 * live longer, reduce TLB misses and improve kernel performance.
517 * But, leaving all kernel text Global makes it potentially accessible
518 * to Meltdown-style attacks which make it trivial to find gadgets or
519 * defeat KASLR.
520 *
521 * Only use global pages when it is really worth it.
522 */
523static inline bool pti_kernel_image_global_ok(void)
524{
525	/*
526	 * Systems with PCIDs get little benefit from global
527	 * kernel text and are not worth the downsides.
528	 */
529	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
530		return false;
531
532	/*
533	 * Only do global kernel image for pti=auto.  Do the most
534	 * secure thing (not global) if pti=on specified.
535	 */
536	if (pti_mode != PTI_AUTO)
537		return false;
538
539	/*
540	 * K8 may not tolerate the cleared _PAGE_RW on the userspace
541	 * global kernel image pages.  Do the safe thing (disable
542	 * global kernel image).  This is unlikely to ever be
543	 * noticed because PTI is disabled by default on AMD CPUs.
544	 */
545	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_K8))
546		return false;
547
548	/*
549	 * RANDSTRUCT derives its hardening benefits from the
550	 * attacker's lack of knowledge about the layout of kernel
551	 * data structures.  Keep the kernel image non-global in
552	 * cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a
553	 * secret.
554	 */
555	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT))
556		return false;
557
558	return true;
559}
560
561/*
562 * For some configurations, map all of kernel text into the user page
563 * tables.  This reduces TLB misses, especially on non-PCID systems.
564 */
565static void pti_clone_kernel_text(void)
566{
567	/*
568	 * rodata is part of the kernel image and is normally
569	 * readable on the filesystem or on the web.  But, do not
570	 * clone the areas past rodata, they might contain secrets.
571	 */
572	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
573	unsigned long end_clone  = (unsigned long)__end_rodata_aligned;
574	unsigned long end_global = PFN_ALIGN((unsigned long)_etext);
575
576	if (!pti_kernel_image_global_ok())
577		return;
578
579	pr_debug("mapping partial kernel image into user address space\n");
580
581	/*
582	 * Note that this will undo _some_ of the work that
583	 * pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() did to clear the
584	 * global bit.
585	 */
586	pti_clone_pgtable(start, end_clone, PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE, false);
587
588	/*
589	 * pti_clone_pgtable() will set the global bit in any PMDs
590	 * that it clones, but we also need to get any PTEs in
591	 * the last level for areas that are not huge-page-aligned.
592	 */
593
594	/* Set the global bit for normal non-__init kernel text: */
595	set_memory_global(start, (end_global - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
596}
597
598static void pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal(void)
599{
600	/*
601	 * The identity map is created with PMDs, regardless of the
602	 * actual length of the kernel.  We need to clear
603	 * _PAGE_GLOBAL up to a PMD boundary, not just to the end
604	 * of the image.
605	 */
606	unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
607	unsigned long end = ALIGN((unsigned long)_end, PMD_SIZE);
608
609	/*
610	 * This clears _PAGE_GLOBAL from the entire kernel image.
611	 * pti_clone_kernel_text() map put _PAGE_GLOBAL back for
612	 * areas that are mapped to userspace.
613	 */
614	set_memory_nonglobal(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
615}
616
617/*
618 * Initialize kernel page table isolation
619 */
620void __init pti_init(void)
621{
622	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
623		return;
624
625	pr_info("enabled\n");
626
627#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
628	/*
629	 * We check for X86_FEATURE_PCID here. But the init-code will
630	 * clear the feature flag on 32 bit because the feature is not
631	 * supported on 32 bit anyway. To print the warning we need to
632	 * check with cpuid directly again.
633	 */
634	if (cpuid_ecx(0x1) & BIT(17)) {
635		/* Use printk to work around pr_fmt() */
636		printk(KERN_WARNING "\n");
637		printk(KERN_WARNING "************************************************************\n");
638		printk(KERN_WARNING "** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING!  **\n");
639		printk(KERN_WARNING "**                                                        **\n");
640		printk(KERN_WARNING "** You are using 32-bit PTI on a 64-bit PCID-capable CPU. **\n");
641		printk(KERN_WARNING "** Your performance will increase dramatically if you     **\n");
642		printk(KERN_WARNING "** switch to a 64-bit kernel!                             **\n");
643		printk(KERN_WARNING "**                                                        **\n");
644		printk(KERN_WARNING "** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING!  **\n");
645		printk(KERN_WARNING "************************************************************\n");
646	}
647#endif
648
649	pti_clone_user_shared();
650
651	/* Undo all global bits from the init pagetables in head_64.S: */
652	pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal();
653
654	/* Replace some of the global bits just for shared entry text: */
655	/*
656	 * This is very early in boot. Device and Late initcalls can do
657	 * modprobe before free_initmem() and mark_readonly(). This
658	 * pti_clone_entry_text() allows those user-mode-helpers to function,
659	 * but notably the text is still RW.
660	 */
661	pti_clone_entry_text(false);
662	pti_setup_espfix64();
663	pti_setup_vsyscall();
664}
665
666/*
667 * Finalize the kernel mappings in the userspace page-table. Some of the
668 * mappings for the kernel image might have changed since pti_init()
669 * cloned them. This is because parts of the kernel image have been
670 * mapped RO and/or NX.  These changes need to be cloned again to the
671 * userspace page-table.
672 */
673void pti_finalize(void)
674{
675	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
676		return;
677	/*
678	 * This is after free_initmem() (all initcalls are done) and we've done
679	 * mark_readonly(). Text is now NX which might've split some PMDs
680	 * relative to the early clone.
681	 */
682	pti_clone_entry_text(true);
683	pti_clone_kernel_text();
684
685	debug_checkwx_user();
686}