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sme.c

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linux-6.19.14/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c C
  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  2/*
  3 * AMD Memory Encryption Support
  4 *
  5 * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
  6 *
  7 * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
  8 */
  9
 10/*
 11 * Since we're dealing with identity mappings, physical and virtual
 12 * addresses are the same, so override these defines which are ultimately
 13 * used by the headers in misc.h.
 14 */
 15#define __pa(x)  ((unsigned long)(x))
 16#define __va(x)  ((void *)((unsigned long)(x)))
 17
 18/*
 19 * Special hack: we have to be careful, because no indirections are
 20 * allowed here, and paravirt_ops is a kind of one. As it will only run in
 21 * baremetal anyway, we just keep it from happening. (This list needs to
 22 * be extended when new paravirt and debugging variants are added.)
 23 */
 24#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
 25#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
 26#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS
 27
 28/*
 29 * This code runs before CPU feature bits are set. By default, the
 30 * pgtable_l5_enabled() function uses bit X86_FEATURE_LA57 to determine if
 31 * 5-level paging is active, so that won't work here. USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
 32 * is provided to handle this situation and, instead, use a variable that
 33 * has been set by the early boot code.
 34 */
 35#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
 36
 37#include <linux/kernel.h>
 38#include <linux/mm.h>
 39#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 40#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 41
 42#include <asm/init.h>
 43#include <asm/setup.h>
 44#include <asm/sections.h>
 45#include <asm/coco.h>
 46#include <asm/sev.h>
 47
 48#define PGD_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
 49#define P4D_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
 50#define PUD_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
 51#define PMD_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
 52
 53#define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE		(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
 54
 55#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC		PMD_FLAGS_LARGE
 56#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP	((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
 57				 (_PAGE_PAT_LARGE | _PAGE_PWT))
 58
 59#define PMD_FLAGS_ENC		(PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
 60
 61#define PTE_FLAGS		(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
 62
 63#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC		PTE_FLAGS
 64#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP	((PTE_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
 65				 (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
 66
 67#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC		(PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC)
 68
 69struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
 70	void    *pgtable_area;
 71	pgd_t   *pgd;
 72
 73	pmdval_t pmd_flags;
 74	pteval_t pte_flags;
 75	unsigned long paddr;
 76
 77	unsigned long vaddr;
 78	unsigned long vaddr_end;
 79};
 80
 81/*
 82 * This work area lives in the .init.scratch section, which lives outside of
 83 * the kernel proper. It is sized to hold the intermediate copy buffer and
 84 * more than enough pagetable pages.
 85 *
 86 * By using this section, the kernel can be encrypted in place and it
 87 * avoids any possibility of boot parameters or initramfs images being
 88 * placed such that the in-place encryption logic overwrites them.  This
 89 * section is 2MB aligned to allow for simple pagetable setup using only
 90 * PMD entries (see vmlinux.lds.S).
 91 */
 92static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch");
 93
 94static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
 95{
 96	unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
 97	pgd_t *pgd_p;
 98
 99	pgd_start = ppd->vaddr & PGDIR_MASK;
100	pgd_end = ppd->vaddr_end & PGDIR_MASK;
101
102	pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pgd_t);
103
104	pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr);
105
106	memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
107}
108
109static pud_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
110{
111	pgd_t *pgd;
112	p4d_t *p4d;
113	pud_t *pud;
114	pmd_t *pmd;
115
116	pgd = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr);
117	if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
118		p4d = ppd->pgtable_area;
119		memset(p4d, 0, sizeof(*p4d) * PTRS_PER_P4D);
120		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
121		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(PGD_FLAGS | __pa(p4d)));
122	}
123
124	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, ppd->vaddr);
125	if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
126		pud = ppd->pgtable_area;
127		memset(pud, 0, sizeof(*pud) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
128		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
129		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(P4D_FLAGS | __pa(pud)));
130	}
131
132	pud = pud_offset(p4d, ppd->vaddr);
133	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
134		pmd = ppd->pgtable_area;
135		memset(pmd, 0, sizeof(*pmd) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
136		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
137		set_pud(pud, __pud(PUD_FLAGS | __pa(pmd)));
138	}
139
140	if (pud_leaf(*pud))
141		return NULL;
142
143	return pud;
144}
145
146static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
147{
148	pud_t *pud;
149	pmd_t *pmd;
150
151	pud = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd);
152	if (!pud)
153		return;
154
155	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
156	if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
157		return;
158
159	set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
160}
161
162static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
163{
164	pud_t *pud;
165	pmd_t *pmd;
166	pte_t *pte;
167
168	pud = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd);
169	if (!pud)
170		return;
171
172	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
173	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
174		pte = ppd->pgtable_area;
175		memset(pte, 0, sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
176		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
177		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
178	}
179
180	if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
181		return;
182
183	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, ppd->vaddr);
184	if (pte_none(*pte))
185		set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
186}
187
188static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
189{
190	while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
191		sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd);
192
193		ppd->vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
194		ppd->paddr += PMD_SIZE;
195	}
196}
197
198static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
199{
200	while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
201		sme_populate_pgd(ppd);
202
203		ppd->vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
204		ppd->paddr += PAGE_SIZE;
205	}
206}
207
208static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
209				   pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags)
210{
211	unsigned long vaddr_end;
212
213	ppd->pmd_flags = pmd_flags;
214	ppd->pte_flags = pte_flags;
215
216	/* Save original end value since we modify the struct value */
217	vaddr_end = ppd->vaddr_end;
218
219	/* If start is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */
220	ppd->vaddr_end = ALIGN(ppd->vaddr, PMD_SIZE);
221	__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
222
223	/* Create PMD entries */
224	ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end & PMD_MASK;
225	__sme_map_range_pmd(ppd);
226
227	/* If end is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */
228	ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end;
229	__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
230}
231
232static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
233{
234	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
235}
236
237static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
238{
239	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
240}
241
242static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
243{
244	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP);
245}
246
247static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
248{
249	unsigned long entries = 0, tables = 0;
250
251	/*
252	 * Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable
253	 * entries that are needed. Those mappings will be covered mostly
254	 * by 2MB PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required
255	 * number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the
256	 * mappings.  For mappings that are not 2MB aligned, PTE mappings
257	 * would be needed for the start and end portion of the address range
258	 * that fall outside of the 2MB alignment.  This results in, at most,
259	 * two extra pages to hold PTE entries for each range that is mapped.
260	 * Incrementing the count for each covers the case where the addresses
261	 * cross entries.
262	 */
263
264	/* PGDIR_SIZE is equal to P4D_SIZE on 4-level machine. */
265	if (PTRS_PER_P4D > 1)
266		entries += (DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PGDIR_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
267	entries += (DIV_ROUND_UP(len, P4D_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
268	entries += (DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PUD_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
269	entries += 2 * sizeof(pte_t) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
270
271	/*
272	 * Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate
273	 * the new pagetables.
274	 */
275
276	if (PTRS_PER_P4D > 1)
277		tables += DIV_ROUND_UP(entries, PGDIR_SIZE) * sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
278	tables += DIV_ROUND_UP(entries, P4D_SIZE) * sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
279	tables += DIV_ROUND_UP(entries, PUD_SIZE) * sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
280
281	return entries + tables;
282}
283
284void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
285{
286	unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
287	unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
288	unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
289	unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_end, initrd_len;
290	struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd;
291	unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
292	unsigned long decrypted_base;
293
294	/*
295	 * This is early code, use an open coded check for SME instead of
296	 * using cc_platform_has(). This eliminates worries about removing
297	 * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has()
298	 * function.
299	 */
300	if (!sme_get_me_mask() || sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)
301		return;
302
303	/*
304	 * Prepare for encrypting the kernel and initrd by building new
305	 * pagetables with the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the
306	 * kernel in place.
307	 *
308	 *   One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
309	 *   by the kernel and initrd as encrypted.
310	 *
311	 *   Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
312	 *   by the kernel and initrd as decrypted and write-protected.
313	 *
314	 *     The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the
315	 *     memory from being cached.
316	 */
317
318	kernel_start = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_text);
319	kernel_end = ALIGN((unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_end), PMD_SIZE);
320	kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
321
322	initrd_start = 0;
323	initrd_end = 0;
324	initrd_len = 0;
325#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
326	initrd_len = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_size |
327		     ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_size << 32);
328	if (initrd_len) {
329		initrd_start = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_image |
330			       ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_image << 32);
331		initrd_end = PAGE_ALIGN(initrd_start + initrd_len);
332		initrd_len = initrd_end - initrd_start;
333	}
334#endif
335
336	/*
337	 * Calculate required number of workarea bytes needed:
338	 *   executable encryption area size:
339	 *     stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
340	 *     encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
341	 *     intermediate copy buffer (PMD_SIZE)
342	 *   pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
343	 *   pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
344	 */
345	execute_start = workarea_start = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(sme_workarea);
346	execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_SIZE;
347	execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;
348
349	/*
350	 * One PGD for both encrypted and decrypted mappings and a set of
351	 * PUDs and PMDs for each of the encrypted and decrypted mappings.
352	 */
353	pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
354	pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2;
355	if (initrd_len)
356		pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(initrd_len) * 2;
357
358	/* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */
359	pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len);
360
361	/*
362	 * The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and
363	 * the pagetable area. The start of the workarea is already 2MB
364	 * aligned, align the end of the workarea on a 2MB boundary so that
365	 * we don't try to create/allocate PTE entries from the workarea
366	 * before it is mapped.
367	 */
368	workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len;
369	workarea_end = ALIGN(workarea_start + workarea_len, PMD_SIZE);
370
371	/*
372	 * Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable
373	 * structures (PGDs, PUDs and PMDs) will be allocated. New pagetable
374	 * structures are created when the workarea is added to the current
375	 * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel
376	 * mappings are populated.
377	 */
378	ppd.pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
379
380	/*
381	 * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for
382	 * addressing the workarea.
383	 */
384	ppd.pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
385	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
386	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
387	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
388	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
389
390	/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
391	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
392
393	/*
394	 * A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel
395	 * and initrd to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will
396	 * then be populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and
397	 * decrypted kernel mappings are created.
398	 */
399	ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area;
400	memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
401	ppd.pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
402
403	/*
404	 * A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different
405	 * pagetable entries for the decrypted mapping. Choose the next
406	 * PGD index and convert it to a virtual address to be used as
407	 * the base of the mapping.
408	 */
409	decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
410	if (initrd_len) {
411		unsigned long check_base;
412
413		check_base = (pgd_index(initrd_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
414		decrypted_base = max(decrypted_base, check_base);
415	}
416	decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
417
418	/* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
419	ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
420	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start;
421	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end;
422	sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
423
424	/* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */
425	ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
426	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
427	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
428	sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
429
430	if (initrd_len) {
431		/* Add encrypted initrd (identity) mappings */
432		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
433		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start;
434		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end;
435		sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
436		/*
437		 * Add decrypted, write-protected initrd (non-identity) mappings
438		 */
439		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
440		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
441		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
442		sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
443	}
444
445	/* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
446	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
447	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
448	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
449	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
450
451	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
452	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
453	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
454	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
455
456	/* Perform the encryption */
457	sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
458			    kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
459
460	if (initrd_len)
461		sme_encrypt_execute(initrd_start, initrd_start + decrypted_base,
462				    initrd_len, workarea_start,
463				    (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
464
465	/*
466	 * At this point we are running encrypted.  Remove the mappings for
467	 * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
468	 * the PGD entry/entries.
469	 */
470	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
471	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
472	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
473
474	if (initrd_len) {
475		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
476		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
477		sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
478	}
479
480	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
481	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
482	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
483
484	/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
485	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
486}
487
488void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
489{
490	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
491	unsigned long feature_mask;
492	unsigned long me_mask;
493	bool snp_en;
494	u64 msr;
495
496	snp_en = snp_init(bp);
497
498	/* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
499	eax = 0x80000000;
500	ecx = 0;
501	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
502	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
503		return;
504
505#define AMD_SME_BIT	BIT(0)
506#define AMD_SEV_BIT	BIT(1)
507
508	/*
509	 * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
510	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
511	 *   - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
512	 *   - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
513	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
514	 *   - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
515	 */
516	eax = 0x8000001f;
517	ecx = 0;
518	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
519	/* Check whether SEV or SME is supported */
520	if (!(eax & (AMD_SEV_BIT | AMD_SME_BIT)))
521		return;
522
523	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
524	sev_snp_needs_sfw = !(ebx & BIT(31));
525
526	/* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */
527	sev_status = msr = native_rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
528	feature_mask = (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
529
530	/*
531	 * Any discrepancies between the presence of a CC blob and SNP
532	 * enablement abort the guest.
533	 */
534	if (snp_en ^ !!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
535		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
536
537	/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
538	if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
539		if (!(bp->hdr.xloadflags & XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION))
540			return;
541
542		/*
543		 * No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to
544		 * prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a
545		 * KVM guest the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG will be sufficient, but there
546		 * might be other hypervisors which emulate that MSR as non-zero
547		 * or even pass it through to the guest.
548		 * A malicious hypervisor can still trick a guest into this
549		 * path, but there is no way to protect against that.
550		 */
551		eax = 1;
552		ecx = 0;
553		native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
554		if (ecx & BIT(31))
555			return;
556
557		/* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */
558		msr = native_rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG);
559		if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
560			return;
561	}
562
563	sme_me_mask	= me_mask;
564	physical_mask	&= ~me_mask;
565	cc_vendor	= CC_VENDOR_AMD;
566	cc_set_mask(me_mask);
567}
568
569#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
570/* Local version for startup code, which never operates on user page tables */
571pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
572{
573	return pgd;
574}
575#endif
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