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stub_exe.c

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linux-6.19.14/arch/um/kernel/skas/stub_exe.c C
  1#include <sys/ptrace.h>
  2#include <sys/prctl.h>
  3#include <sys/fcntl.h>
  4#include <asm/unistd.h>
  5#include <sysdep/stub.h>
  6#include <stub-data.h>
  7#include <linux/filter.h>
  8#include <linux/seccomp.h>
  9#include <generated/asm-offsets.h>
 10
 11void _start(void);
 12
 13noinline static void real_init(void)
 14{
 15	struct stub_init_data init_data;
 16	unsigned long res;
 17	struct {
 18		void  *ss_sp;
 19		int    ss_flags;
 20		size_t ss_size;
 21	} stack = {
 22		.ss_size = STUB_DATA_PAGES * UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE,
 23	};
 24	struct {
 25		void *sa_handler_;
 26		unsigned long sa_flags;
 27		void *sa_restorer;
 28		unsigned long long sa_mask;
 29	} sa = {
 30		/* Need to set SA_RESTORER (but the handler never returns) */
 31		.sa_flags = SA_ONSTACK | SA_NODEFER | SA_SIGINFO | 0x04000000,
 32	};
 33
 34	/* set a nice name */
 35	stub_syscall2(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long)"uml-userspace");
 36
 37	/* Make sure this process dies if the kernel dies */
 38	stub_syscall2(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL);
 39
 40	/* Needed in SECCOMP mode (and safe to do anyway) */
 41	stub_syscall5(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
 42
 43	/* read information from STDIN and close it */
 44	res = stub_syscall3(__NR_read, 0,
 45			    (unsigned long)&init_data, sizeof(init_data));
 46	if (res != sizeof(init_data))
 47		stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 10);
 48
 49	/* In SECCOMP mode, FD 0 is a socket and is later used for FD passing */
 50	if (!init_data.seccomp)
 51		stub_syscall1(__NR_close, 0);
 52	else
 53		stub_syscall3(__NR_fcntl, 0, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
 54
 55	/* map stub code + data */
 56	res = stub_syscall6(STUB_MMAP_NR,
 57			    init_data.stub_start, UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE,
 58			    PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED,
 59			    init_data.stub_code_fd, init_data.stub_code_offset);
 60	if (res != init_data.stub_start)
 61		stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 11);
 62
 63	res = stub_syscall6(STUB_MMAP_NR,
 64			    init_data.stub_start + UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE,
 65			    STUB_DATA_PAGES * UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE,
 66			    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED,
 67			    init_data.stub_data_fd, init_data.stub_data_offset);
 68	if (res != init_data.stub_start + UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE)
 69		stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 12);
 70
 71	/* In SECCOMP mode, we only need the signalling FD from now on */
 72	if (init_data.seccomp) {
 73		res = stub_syscall3(__NR_close_range, 1, ~0U, 0);
 74		if (res != 0)
 75			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 13);
 76	}
 77
 78	/* setup signal stack inside stub data */
 79	stack.ss_sp = (void *)init_data.stub_start + UM_KERN_PAGE_SIZE;
 80	stub_syscall2(__NR_sigaltstack, (unsigned long)&stack, 0);
 81
 82	/* register signal handlers */
 83	sa.sa_handler_ = (void *) init_data.signal_handler;
 84	sa.sa_restorer = (void *) init_data.signal_restorer;
 85	if (!init_data.seccomp) {
 86		/* In ptrace mode, the SIGSEGV handler never returns */
 87		sa.sa_mask = 0;
 88
 89		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGSEGV,
 90				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
 91		if (res != 0)
 92			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 14);
 93	} else {
 94		/* SECCOMP mode uses rt_sigreturn, need to mask all signals */
 95		sa.sa_mask = ~0ULL;
 96
 97		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGSEGV,
 98				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
 99		if (res != 0)
100			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 15);
101
102		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGSYS,
103				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
104		if (res != 0)
105			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 16);
106
107		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGALRM,
108				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
109		if (res != 0)
110			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 17);
111
112		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGTRAP,
113				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
114		if (res != 0)
115			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 18);
116
117		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGILL,
118				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
119		if (res != 0)
120			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 19);
121
122		res = stub_syscall4(__NR_rt_sigaction, SIGFPE,
123				    (unsigned long)&sa, 0, sizeof(sa.sa_mask));
124		if (res != 0)
125			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 20);
126	}
127
128	/*
129	 * If in seccomp mode, install the SECCOMP filter and trigger a syscall.
130	 * Otherwise set PTRACE_TRACEME and do a SIGSTOP.
131	 */
132	if (init_data.seccomp) {
133		struct sock_filter filter[] = {
134#if __BITS_PER_LONG > 32
135			/* [0] Load upper 32bit of instruction pointer from seccomp_data */
136			BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
137				 (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, instruction_pointer) + 4)),
138
139			/* [1] Jump forward 3 instructions if the upper address is not identical */
140			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, (init_data.stub_start) >> 32, 0, 3),
141#endif
142			/* [2] Load lower 32bit of instruction pointer from seccomp_data */
143			BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
144				 (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, instruction_pointer))),
145
146			/* [3] Mask out lower bits */
147			BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K, 0xfffff000),
148
149			/* [4] Jump to [6] if the lower bits are not on the expected page */
150			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, (init_data.stub_start) & 0xfffff000, 1, 0),
151
152			/* [5] Trap call, allow */
153			BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
154
155			/* [6,7] Check architecture */
156			BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
157				 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
158			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
159				 UM_SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE, 1, 0),
160
161			/* [8] Kill (for architecture check) */
162			BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS),
163
164			/* [9] Load syscall number */
165			BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
166				 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
167
168			/* [10-16] Check against permitted syscalls */
169			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_futex,
170				 7, 0),
171			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,__NR_recvmsg,
172				 6, 0),
173			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,__NR_close,
174				 5, 0),
175			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, STUB_MMAP_NR,
176				 4, 0),
177			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_munmap,
178				 3, 0),
179#ifdef __i386__
180			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_set_thread_area,
181				 2, 0),
182#else
183			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_arch_prctl,
184				 2, 0),
185#endif
186			BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn,
187				 1, 0),
188
189			/* [17] Not one of the permitted syscalls */
190			BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS),
191
192			/* [18] Permitted call for the stub */
193			BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
194		};
195		struct sock_fprog prog = {
196			.len = sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0]),
197			.filter = filter,
198		};
199
200		if (stub_syscall3(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER,
201				  SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
202				  (unsigned long)&prog) != 0)
203			stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 21);
204
205		/* Fall through, the exit syscall will cause SIGSYS */
206	} else {
207		stub_syscall4(__NR_ptrace, PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0);
208
209		stub_syscall2(__NR_kill, stub_syscall0(__NR_getpid), SIGSTOP);
210	}
211
212	stub_syscall1(__NR_exit, 30);
213
214	__builtin_unreachable();
215}
216
217__attribute__((naked)) void _start(void)
218{
219	/*
220	 * Since the stack after exec() starts at the top-most address,
221	 * but that's exactly where we also want to map the stub data
222	 * and code, this must:
223	 *  - push the stack by 1 code and STUB_DATA_PAGES data pages
224	 *  - call real_init()
225	 * This way, real_init() can use the stack normally, while the
226	 * original stack further down (higher address) will become
227	 * inaccessible after the mmap() calls above.
228	 */
229	stub_start(real_init);
230}
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